转轨时期我国国有企业的委托代理问题研究——以沪深两市的14家上市银行为例  

The problem of the principle-agent problem of China's state-owned enterprises during the transition period——taking 14 listed banks in Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities as an example

作　　者：李春仙[1] 李香菊[2] Li Chun xian;Li Xiang ju(School of economics and management, Shaanxi Institute of clothing engineering, Xi'an, Shaanxi 712046;School of economics and finance, Xi'an Jiao Tong University, Xi'an, Shaanxi 712000)

机构地区：[1]陕西服装工程学院,陕西西安712046 [2]西安交通大学,陕西西安712000

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2018年第10期55-58,共4页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：陕西省教育厅项目<季羡林国学思想在管理中的应用研究>(编号:18JK0926)

摘　　要：随着我国的经济的飞速发展和改革进入深水区,国有企业的改革也进入攻坚阶段,委托代理问题是困扰国企的一大顽疾,其解决的好坏是影响经济发展的因素之一。本文选取在沪深股市上市的中国14家上市银行在2017年前三个季度的数据作为样本,进行观测,并使用面板数据和STATA13.0对数据进行深入分析,以股权集中度为线索,探究国有企业中存在的问题,并从委托代理理论出发,探讨国有代理人激励约束机制的解决办法,对当前我国国有企业转轨改革具有一定的现实意义。with the rapid development and reform of China’s economy entering the deep water area, the reform of state-owned enterprises has entered a critical stage. The principal-agent problem is a major ailment that plagues state-owned enterprises. The quality of its solution is one of the factors that affect economic development. This paper selects the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market China 14 listed banks in the three quarter of 2017 as the sample observations, and in-depth analysis of the data using panel data and STATA13.0, the concentration of ownership as a clue, explore the existence of problems in the state-owned enterprises, and starting from the principal-agent theory, discuss the incentive the constraint mechanism solution, has certain practical significance to the transition of China’s state-owned enterprise reform.

关 键 词：国有企业 委托代理 激励机制 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]