混合所有制企业的民营化程度如何影响高管薪酬-业绩敏感性?  

Influence of the Privatization Level of Mixed-ownership Firms on Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity

作　　者：陈晓珊 刘洪铎[3] CHEN Xiao-shan;LIU Hong-duo(School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou 510320,China;Institute of Capital Market and Audit Governance Studies for the Great Bay Area(Guangdong,Hong Kong,Macao),Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou 510320,China;School of Economics and Trade,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]广东财经大学会计学院,广东广州510320 [2]广东财经大学粤港澳大湾区资本市场与审计治理研究院,广东广州510320 [3]广东外语外贸大学经济贸易学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2019年第1期49-61,73,共14页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学"十三五"规划项目(GD18YYJ04);广东财经大学粤港澳大湾区资本市场与审计治理研究院2018年规划项目(2018A05)

摘　　要：在中国深化改革、推进转型的特殊背景下,探索出一条适合中国混合所有制企业实际情况的高管薪酬制度改革路径是现阶段中国国有企业改革亟待解决的问题之一。高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性是判断薪酬激励契约有效性的主要指标,基于此,文章首先构建一个委托-代理框架下的寡头市场模型,从理论上分析混合所有制企业的民营化程度与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性之间的关系;其次选择2007—2016年沪深两市A股经过民营化的国有控股上市公司数据进行实证检验。结果发现:总体上,提高混合所有制企业的民营化程度会显著增强高管薪酬-业绩敏感性;进一步分析发现,混合所有制企业中非国有股比例小于67%时,提高民营化程度会降低高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性;非国有股比例介于67%～75%之间时,提高民营化程度对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性没有显著影响;非国有股比例大于75%时,提高民营化程度会提升高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性。Under circumstances of promoting reform and transformation in China,exploring a new executive pay system suitable for the Chinese mixed ownership enterprises is one of the most urgent tasks in the reform of the Chinese state-owned enterprises.Executive pay-performance sensitivity is the main index to judge the effectiveness of the compensation contract.Based on it,an oligopoly market model of principal-agent is built to analyze the relationship between the privatization level and executive pay-performance sensitivity;then,an empirical test is conducted on the theoretical proposition with the large sample data of A-share state-controlled listed companies from 2007 to 2016.The result shows that improving privatization level of the mixed-ownership firms can significantly enhance the executive pay-performance sensitivity on the whole.Further analysis suggests that when non-state-owned share proportion in the mixed ownership firm is less than 67%,raising privatization level will reduce the pay-performance sensitivity;when non-state-owned share proportion ranges between 67%-75%,improving privatization level has no significant effect on executive pay-performance sensitivity;when non-state-owned share proportion is greater than 75%,increasing privatization level will promote the executive pay-performance sensitivity.

关 键 词：混合所有制企业 民营化程度 国有股比例 高管薪酬 业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]