延展心灵自主性的动态解释  

A Dynamical Explanation about Agency of the Extended Mind

作　　者：董云峰 Dong Yunfeng

机构地区：[1]天津工业大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《南开学报（哲学社会科学版）》2019年第2期132-139,共8页Nankai Journal:Philosophy,Literature and Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(16BZ023);教育部社会科学基金青年项目(15YJC720005);国家社会科学基金重大项目(15ZDB018)

摘　　要：延展心灵能否解释意向行为?克莱兰德认为用延展心灵理论解释行动,外部化行为动机,致使延展心灵与标准的行动观念相悖,从而使延展心灵的自主性在形而上学上不可行、在概念上无法识别,更主要的原因是延展心灵对行动的解释不符合戴维森的"动机-因果论"。然而,戴维森的"动机-因果论"也有自身的缺陷,它没有说明意义如何流入行为。对此,可以用动态系统弥补这个缺陷,即自上而下的因果关系重新解释意向行为的"自主控制"。Can the extended mind explain the intentional behavior?Cleland argues that the extended mind theory forces us to give up our causal sovereignty when it comes to our actions,and therefore renders us not agentially responsible for them.If the extended mind theory is metaphysically incompatible with this very idea,the theory includes a deep inconsistency.The main reason for this is that the explanation on behavior by extended mind would not conform to Davidson’s argument of"motivation-causality".However,Davidson’s argument has its own drawbacks.It does not explain how meaning flows into behavior.A better approach is to reinterpret"the agential control"with the top-down causality.

关 键 词：延展心灵 自主性 自主体 动态系统 

分 类 号：B842.1[哲学宗教—基础心理学]