教育的信号效应及其市场价值——基于统计性歧视和雇主学习的视角  

Educational Signaling and Its Market Value: From the Theory of Statistical Discrimination and Employer Learning

作　　者：王骏[1,2] 赵加良[1] Wang Jun;Zhao Jialiang(Business School,Beijing Normal University;Training and Research Base for College Counselors Affiliated to the Ministry of Education,Beijing Normal University)

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院 [2]教育部高校辅导员培训和研修基地(北京师范大学)

出　　处：《劳动经济研究》2019年第1期52-77,共26页Studies in Labor Economics

摘　　要：文章从统计性歧视和雇主学习的理论视角,借助Altonji&Pierret (2001)和Lange (2007)提出的方法考察了教育的信号效应在中国劳动力市场的发挥情况,并测算了教育信号的市场价值。研究发现,随着工作经验的增长,教育对收入的影响显著减弱,而能力对收入的影响却有所增强。雇主学习的速度虽然很快,但雇主的初始预期生产率误差具有相对持久性。当贴现率为7. 18%时,教育信号的市场价值即多接受一年教育所带来的终生收入现值的增量中信号效应的贡献的上界约为16%。该结果对贴现率、雇主学习的速度和潜在工作经验长度的变化非常敏感,但对教育成本的变化并不敏感。From the theoretical perspective of statistical discrimination based on education and employer learning,this paper empirically analyzes educational signaling in China's labor market and measures its market value using the method proposed by Altonji&Pierret(2001)and Lange(2007).It is found that as working experience grows,the effect of education decreases while the effect of ability increases.Although the speed of employer learning is fast,the initial expected productivity error is relatively persistent.When the discount rate remains 7.18 percent,the upper bound on market value of educational signaling,defined by the percentage contribution of signaling to the increase in lifetime earnings due to an additional year of schooling,is about 16 percent.The simulation results are very sensitive to the discount rate,the speed of employer learning,and the length of potential experience,but not sensitive to educational cost.

关 键 词：教育信号 市场价值 统计性歧视 雇主学习 

分 类 号：G40-054[文化科学—教育学原理]