生命主体与道德地位——动物权利论的理论缺陷与实践困境  

Subject of Life and Moral Status——Theoretical Defect and Practice Dilemma of Animal Rights Theory

作　　者：张燕[1] ZHANG Yan(School of Public Administration,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《齐鲁学刊》2019年第3期78-83,共6页Qilu Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目"中医药产业中动物利用的伦理困境与对策研究"(17BZX101);江苏省社会科学基金青年项目"动物医疗应用的伦理困境与对策研究"(15ZXC004);2018年度江苏省高校优秀中青年教师和校长境外研修项目资助

摘　　要：以汤姆·雷根为代表的动物权利论以"生命主体"概念作为其立论基础,认为非人类动物也是"生命主体",因而享有与人类同等的道德地位。然而,"生命主体"这一定义本身,以及从"生命主体"到拥有道德地位的论证过程都存在着理论缺陷与论证断裂。在实践层面,动物权利论也难以回答生产生活中的动物利用与生态环境保护等现实问题。因此,环境伦理学的发展,既要关注人类在权利话语体系内保护动物的应然性,也要考虑权利主体的扩张带来的权利虚空性代价,慎重对待动物的道德地位,积极寻求新的理论途径以解决人与动物的关系问题。The animal rights theory represented by Tom Regan is based on the concept of"subject of life".He believes that non-human animals are also"subjects of life"and thus enjoy the same moral status as human beings.However,the definition of"subject of life"itself has theoretical flaws,and the process of argumentation from"subject of life"to possessing moral status is fractured.At the practical version,animal rights theory is also difficult to answer realistic questions such as animal utilization and environment protection.Therefore,the development of environmental ethics should not only pay attention to the human nature of protecting animals in the discourse system of rights,but also consider the cost of the void of rights brought by the expansion of rights subjects,deal with the moral status of animals cautiously,and actively seek new theoretical approaches to solving the relationship between human beings and animals.

关 键 词：动物权利 生命主体 道德地位 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]