我国公立医院院长薪酬改革的政策与理论分析  

Policy and Theoretical Analysis of the Annual Salary Reform for Presents of Public Hospitals in China

作　　者：严华 陈英 周徐红 许靖 汤群 刘姗姗 王箐 张宜民 YAN Hua;CHEN Ying;ZHOU Xu-hong(Pudong Institute of Health Development,Shanghai,200129,China)

机构地区：[1]上海市浦东卫生发展研究院,上海200129 [2]上海市浦东新区卫生健康委员会,上海200129

出　　处：《中国医院管理》2019年第7期11-13,共3页Chinese Hospital Management

基　　金：上海市浦东新区卫生和计划生育委员会卫生科技项目(PW2017A-3)

摘　　要：医院院长年薪制作为国际惯例,已逐步成为我国公立医院改革的发展趋势。在政策层面,我国逐步确定、推动和规范公立医院年薪制改革的发展和具体实施。在理论层面,公立医院院长年薪制能够解决信息不对称导致的院长委托代理问题,为公立医院院长年薪制实施提供了理论证据。根据国际上医院院长实施年薪制的经验及国内相关实践,探讨我国公立医院院长年薪制改革的趋势和方向。The annual performance salary system for the presents of public hospital is the trend of the reform of medical and health system,which has been carried on in the international society for many years. At the policy level,guidance and specific implementation of annual salary system in public hospitals have been gradually determined,encouraged and standardized. From theoretical point of view,the annual salary system for presents in public hospitals could be used to solve the principal-agent problem due to information asymmetry,which provide theoretical support for the annual salary system. Based on the international experiences and China’s exploratory practice,the study puts forward the direction for the annual salary system of the presents in public hospital.

关 键 词：公立医院院长 年薪制 委托代理 

分 类 号：R197.3[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]