经理任期、声誉效应与过度投资——U型理论与经验证据  

MANAGER’S TENURE,REPUTATION EFFECT AND OVER-INVESTMENT——U-shaped Theory and Empirical Analysis

作　　者：米运生 杨天健 石晓敏 李宇豪 MI Yun-sheng;YANG Tian-jian;SHI Xiao-min;LI Yu-hao(National School of Agricultural Institution and Development, South China Agricultural University;Beijing Road Sub-Branch, Guangdong Branch, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China)

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学国家农业制度与发展研究院,510642 [2]中国工商银行广东省分行北京路支行

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2019年第6期101-112,共12页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(16AJY015);广东省教育厅创新团队项目(2017WCXTD001)的资助

摘　　要：声誉效应可以缓解代理冲突并抑制过度投资,但其效果却随任期期限临近而衰退。本文理论分析了企业过度投资与经理任期之间的U型关系。以中国A股上市公司为样本,运用门限自回归实证模型,进行实证分析。本文研究发现:作为声誉效应的代理变量,经理任期对过度投资的影响呈U型。在经理任期达到特定门限值42个月之前,经理任期与过度投资呈负相关关系。在门限值之后,声誉效应逐渐失去作用,随着经理任期的增加,过度投资程度提高。The reputation effect is thought to be a method to moral hazard and curb over-investment. But reputational effects also has flaws. Its effect will be accelerated recession when manager's tenure is off office approach. This paper theoretically analyzes the U-shaped relationship between over-investment and manager's tenure and give an empirical analysis of listed companies in Chinese A shares market by using TAR model. The paper draws the following conclusions: as a proxy variable of reputation effect, the influence of manager's tenure on over-investment is U-shaped. Manager's tenure is negatively related to over-investment before its threshold (42 months). The degree of over-investment increased after manager's tenure reached its threshold. At this time, the reputation loses its effect gradually.

关 键 词：经理任期 声誉效应 过度投资 U型关系 门限自回归模型 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]