人为什么能够占有外在的对象?——论康德对财产权的演绎  

Why can People Possess External Objects? ——On Kant’s Interpretation of Property Rights

作　　者：刘作[1] LIU Zuo(School of Humanities,Southeast University)

机构地区：[1]东南大学人文学院

出　　处：《当代中国价值观研究》2019年第2期28-37,共10页Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目“康德后期伦理学研究”(15CZX049);2011计划“公民道德与社会风尚协同创新中心”的阶段性成果

摘　　要：洛克通过自然法说明,人的自由使他能够使用外在的事物,劳动确立起他的财产权,即占有某个对象。但这并没有说明财产权如何是可能的。要解决这个问题,康德从先验观念论出发,区分了不同的占有,说明经验性的占有预设了理知的占有。关于理知的占有的命题是一个先天综合命题,需要演绎。演绎的可能性在于实践理性的法权公设。这个公设作为一个许可的法则,与普遍的法权原理不冲突,而且扩展了人的自由。康德对占有的演绎实质上是从意志的形式性方面转向到质料性方面。这种演绎把自由与占有的概念结合起来,一方面为自然法的财产权理论奠定了理性的基础,另外一方面开启了他之后的哲学家讨论财产权的方向。Through natural law,Locke explains that human freedom enables people to use external things,and labor establishes property rights,that is,possesses an object. This does not explain how property rights are possible. To solve this problem,based on transcendental idealism,Kant distinguishes between different possessions,indicating that empirical possession presupposes the intelligible possession. The proposition of the intelligible possession is a synthetic a priori judgment that needs to be deductive. The possibility of deduction is the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights. This postulate,as a rule of permission,does not conflict with the universal principle of right and extends human freedom. Kant s interpretation of possession is essentially a shift from the formal aspect of the will to the material aspect. This kind of deduction combines the concept of freedom and possession. On the one hand,it lays a rational foundation for the theory of property rights of natural law. On the other hand,it opens the direction of philosophers who followed him to discuss property rights.

关 键 词：自由 任性 实践理性的法权公设 占有 财产权 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]