政府与企业间减排的激励与监督机制研究  

Game between Government and Enterprise:A Study on the Incentive and Monitoring Mechanism of Emission Reduction

作　　者：陈克贵[1] 曹庆仁[1] 王新宇[1] 张明慧[1] CHEN Ke-gui;CAO Qing-ren;WANG Xin-yu;ZHANG Ming-hui(School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 221116)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院

出　　处：《商学研究》2019年第4期5-12,共8页Commercial Science Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:71573252、71871215);教育部人文社会科学基金项目(项目编号:17YJC630012);江苏省社会科学基金项目(项目编号:15JD038、18JD014)

摘　　要：针对政府引导企业减排中的信息不对称问题,考虑政企间的委托代理关系,分别建立纯激励模型和激励监督模型。研究政企间的博弈关系,并将具有成本的监督强度作为可调节的变量融入激励监督机制中。最后求解并分析模型,比较两种机制下政企双方的决策和收益。结果表明:相对纯激励机制,激励监督机制使得企业的减排努力和政府的收益都提高,即政府通过一定的激励监督策略能更加有效地引导企业减排,为政府制订减排激励监督决策提供了有力的决策支持。In view of the problem of information asymmetry in government-induced enterprise emission reduction, considering the principal agent relationship between government and enterprise, we build a pure incentive model and a model with incentive and monitoring. To discuss the game relationship between them, this paper integrates the costly supervisory intensity that can be adjusted as a variable into incentive and monitoring mechanism. Furthermore, the corresponding models are solved and analyzed, and the decisions and income of both sides are further compared under the two mechanisms. The results show that the incentive and monitoring mechanism improves both the enterprise’ s emission reduction efforts and the government’ s income increase, compared with the simple incentive mechanism. It also means that, the government can induce the enterprises to reduce emissions more effectively through a certain degree of incentive and monitoring strategies. This paper provides a decision support for the government to stimulate the enterprise’ s emission reduction.

关 键 词：减排 委托代理理论 不对称信息 激励监督 

分 类 号：X22[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F272[经济管理—企业管理]