CEO权力与公司现金持有——基于市值管理的研究  

The CEO Power and Corporate Cash Holdings——A Study Based on the Role of Market Value Management

作　　者：陈志红[1] 汪官镇 王诗雨[2] Chen Zhihong;Wang Guanzhen;Wang Shiyu

机构地区：[1]南京大学海外教育学院,210093 [2]东南大学经管学院/现代管理会计创新研究中心,211189

出　　处：《江苏社会科学》2019年第5期57-68,258,共13页Jiangsu Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“政府规制、产品市场竞争网络与企业财务风险衍化”(71872040);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(20I7ZDXM003);江苏省社科应用研究精品工程财经发展专项课题(17SCA-01);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(2242019S 10008; 2242019S30017; 2242019S30018; 242018S30042)阶段性成果

摘　　要：以代理理论和管家理论为切入点,选取2007-2015年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,在股票市场“全流通”背景下,实证分析了CEO权力对公司现金持有的影响,以及市值管理对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现:CEO权力越大,公司现金持有水平越高。同时,随着CEO权力的增强,公司持有的现金会获得更高的现金持有价值,CEO代理冲突并没有使现金持有的价值效应为负,市值管理对CEO权力与公司现金持有水平关系的抑制作用并不显著。进一步研究表明,市值管理总体上对CEO权力与公司现金持有价值之间的关系具有正向调节作用。Based on the agency theory and the stewardship theory, this paper selects 2007-2015 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges A Share Index as the sample, and analyzes empirically the effect of the CEO power on corporate cash holdings as well as the role of market value manage - ment in adjusting the relation between the CEO power and corporate cash holdings against the background of full circulation in the stock market. The research findings show that the greater the CEO power is, the larger proportion corporate cash holdings have. In the meantime, with the increase of the CEO power, cash holdings obtain a higher value and the CEO agent conflict does not make the cash holding value effect negative. However, the inhibitive effect of market value management on the relationship between the CEO power and corporate cash holdings is not significant. Further research shows that market value management generally has a positive adjusting effect on the relationship between the CEO power and the value of corporate cash holdings.

关 键 词：CEO权力 公司现金持有 市值管理 管家理论 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F275