反恐融资领域的国际机制间合作——政治机会与决策程序的视角  

Political Opportunity,Decision-Making Procedure and Cooperation Among International Regimes in Counter-Terrorism Financing

作　　者：刘宏松 林海文 Liu Hongsong;Lin Haiwen(Professor in the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Shanghai International Studies University;Research Fellow in Center for EU Studies at Shanghai International Studies University)

机构地区：[1]上海外国语大学国际关系与公共事务学院,上海200083 [2]上海外国语大学欧盟研究中心,上海200083

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2019年第9期107-131,158-159,共27页World Economics and Politics

摘　　要：国际机制间合作需要满足能力互补和目标相容两个条件。在能力互补的两项国际机制之间需要达成目标相容,才能实现合作。政治机会可以改变源机制成员国对解决特定问题的优先性认识以及目标机制成员国对特定问题的紧迫性认识,从而促进相容目标的形成。目标机制的决策程序则会影响其成员国达成相容目标的难易程度。排除低等级政治机会和决策程序极为不利两种极端情形,存在高等级政治机会+决策程序较为有利、高等级政治机会+决策程序较为不利、中等级政治机会+决策程序较为有利、中等级政治机会+决策程序较为不利四种情形。在第一种情形下容易实现国际机制间合作。在第二种情形和第三种情形下,尽管存在不利条件,源机制仍然能够实现与目标机制的合作。在第四种情形下,不会出现国际机制间合作。通过对九一一事件之后金融行动特别工作组与国际货币基金组织及金融行动特别工作组与联合国在反恐融资领域合作的案例分析,上述四种情形的分析性预期得到了实证支持。International regime cooperation needs to meet two criteria, namely, the complementarity of capacities and the compatibility of goals. The cooperation of two in? ternational regimes with complementary capabilities can be achieved only if their objectives are compatible. Political opportunities contribute to the formation of the compatible goals by changing the original regime members' perception of the priority of solving specific problems and the target regime members?? perception of the urgency of specific problems. The decisionmaking procedure of the target regime affects the level of diffi? culty in achieving compatible goals among its member states. Apart from the two extreme scenarios of low political opportunity and extremely unfavorable decision?making process, there are four scenarios: high political opportunity plus favorable decision-making process, high political opportunity plus unfavorable decisionmaking process, medium political opportunity plus favorable decision-making process, and medium political opportunity plus unfavorable decision-making process. In the first scenario, cooperation among international regimes is easy to achieve. In the second and third scenarios, the original regime is able to achieve cooperation with the target regime despite adverse conditions. In the fourth scenario, there is no result of cooperation between international regimes. These analytical expectations are empirically supported by the case analysis of the cooperation between FATF and IMF, and the cooperation between FATF and the United Nations in anti?terrorism financing after September 11.

关 键 词：反恐融资 政治机会 决策程序 国际机制 金融行动特别工作组 

分 类 号：D815[政治法律—国际关系] D813[政治法律—政治学]