知觉的确定性与可错性——基于胡塞尔现象学的考察  

The Validity and Fallibility of Perception from the Perspective of Husserlian Phenomenology

作　　者：赵猛 ZHAO Meng(University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 102488, China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学

出　　处：《云南大学学报（社会科学版）》2019年第6期36-43,共8页The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目“胡塞尔的语言符号理论研究”(项目号:17CZX044)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：知觉认知的确定性是认知者关于外部世界的知识有效性的一个基础。怀疑论从每一个知觉都可能是错的出发,对知觉认知的确定性发起了挑战。关于知觉的现象学研究表明,知觉经验在原则上是开放的,即具体的知觉认知是可错的和可修正的,所以不具有最终的确定性。然而,现象学关于知觉的先验论证表明,我们的知觉仍然是朝世界开放的,是关于外部世界的认知。无论对于理解知觉认知的本质,还是对于回应极端的怀疑论,胡塞尔的知觉现象学仍然具有重要的理论意义。The validity of perceptual cognition is a basis for the cognitive knowledge of the external world. Skepticism starts from the fact that every perception might be false so as to challenge the validity of perceptual cognition. Phenomenological studies on perception show that perceptual experience is in principle open to correction. Specific perceptual cognition does not have definitive certainty. However, the transcendental argument of phenomenology about perception shows that our perception serves as a valid cognitive access to the external world. Husserl’ s phenomenology of perception still has theoretical significance, both for understanding the nature of perceptual cognition and for responding to radical skepticism.

关 键 词：知觉 确定性 胡塞尔现象学 怀疑论 

分 类 号：B516.32[哲学宗教—外国哲学]