信息不对称下医疗服务供应链激励机制研究  

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Medical Service Supply Chain Under Information Asymmetry

作　　者：路应金[1] 邓玉琴 徐雪砜 LU Ying-jin;DENG Yu-qin;XU Xue-feng(University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731 China)

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》2019年第5期88-95,共8页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372140);教育部人文社科专项任务项目(13JDGC002)

摘　　要：供需双方的信息不对称是分级诊疗资源匹配的瓶颈问题,也是医疗服务供应链协调的难点问题。应用委托代理理论,针对医疗服务供应商的激励问题,通过研究医疗服务机构基于最优努力水平的医疗服务质量提升路径下,实现医疗服务供应链利益最大化,不断提高诊疗服务供应链的声誉,促进医疗卫生改革健康持续发展。敏感性分析表明:医生佣金率和努力程度对医疗服务供应链运营产生重要影响,而提高医疗服务的回报因子能提高医生的医疗服务努力程度。弹性分析得出:医疗服务供应链激励机制能提高医疗服务的回报因子和医生的佣金率,并降低支付给医生的固定报酬。The information asymmetry between the supply and demand parties is the bottleneck of the treatment resources matching of classified diagnosis,and it is also a difficult problem for the coordination of the supply chain of medical services.Applying the principal-agent theory,aiming at the incentive problem of medical service providers,through the research of medical service quality improvement path based on the best effort level of medical service institutions,we studied how to maximize the benefits of medical service supply chain,continuously improve the reputation of supply chain of medical service and promote healthy and sustainable development of health care reform.Sensitivity analysis shows that doctor commission rates and efforts have an important impact on the health care supply chain operations,and improving the rewards of medical services can improve the doctor's medical service efforts.The elasticity analysis shows that the medical service supply chain incentive mechanism can improve the reward factor of medical services and the doctor's commission rate,and reduce the fixed payment paid to doctors.

关 键 词：委托代理 医疗服务平台 信息不对称 激励机制 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]