“无欲”概念的理智德性维度  

The Rational Virtue Dimension of the Concept of “No Desire”

作　　者：谢阳举[1] Xie Yangju

机构地区：[1]西北大学中国思想史研究所

出　　处：《江西社会科学》2019年第10期5-12,254,共9页Jiangxi Social Sciences

摘　　要：道家的"无欲"概念不仅是一种伦理德性,也是一种理智德性。老子的"有欲"是一种认知策略,而"无欲"则是一种更根本的理智德性。一方面,"无欲"包含追求理智善的动机成分,即试图理解"道",另一方面,"无欲"有助于认知者保持心灵开放、理智勇气、思维公正等理智德性,因而能够使认知者可靠地获得理智善。作为"理智德性"的无欲在伦理、劳作、艺术等其他理智生活领域也发挥着重要作用。The concept of“no desire”of Taoism is not only an ethical virtue,but also a rational virtue.In the first chapter of Laozi,“desire”is a cognitive strategy,while“no desire”is a more fundamental rational virtue.On the one hand,“no desire”contains the motive component of pursuing the intellectual good,that is,trying to understand“Tao”.On the other hand,“no desire”helps the cognitive to maintain the rational virtue of mind opening,rational courage,thinking justice,etc.,so that the cognitive can reliably obtain the intellectual good.As“rational virtue”,“no desire”also plays an important role in other rational life fields such as ethics,labor,art and so on.

关 键 词：无欲 有欲 德性知识论 理智德性 

分 类 号：B223[哲学宗教—中国哲学]