从苦恼到朝向他者:列维纳斯关于恶的现象学  

From “angoisse” to Facing to the Other:Levinas’s Phenomenology about Evil

作　　者：刘文瑾[1] LIU Wenjin

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学中文系

出　　处：《上海师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2019年第6期17-23,共7页Journal of Shanghai Normal University(Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目“道德崩溃与现代性危机——围绕列维纳斯、阿伦特和帕托什卡”(12CZX050)

摘　　要：恶的问题是贯穿列维纳斯一生哲学追问的思想线索。他虽未给恶下过定义,却对恶进行了现象学描述,探索恶的超越之途。他指出,恶的首要特点是"过度",其精神上最尖锐的表现是苦恼。这苦恼作为海德格尔意义上的"畏",是对死亡背后之虚无的预感和揭示。然而,与海德格尔不同,列维纳斯并不对苦恼抱积极态度,而将其视为有待救赎的状态。因此他随即指出,恶的另一面是对灵魂"意向"的触动,对灵魂与大写之"你"--上帝--之间关系的激发,是感知超越性并与他人面对面的契机。The problem of evil is a clue to understand Levinas’ s philosophy. Although he didn’t give a definition of evil, he carried out some phenomenological descriptions of evil, and explored the way to transcend evil. He pointed out that the primary characteristic of evil is "excess", and its most acute mental manifestation is "l’angoisse". This "angoisse", as "angst" in the sense of Heidegger, is a presentiment and revelation of the nihilism behind death. However, unlike Heidegger, Levinas did not take a positive attitude towards "angoisse", but regarded it as a state to be redeemed. Therefore, he immediately pointed out that the other side of evil is the touch of the soul’s "intention", the stimulation of the relationship between the soul and the "You" – God, as well as the opportunity to perceive transcendence and to face to the Other.

关 键 词：列维纳斯 恶 苦恼(angoisse) 他者 超越 

分 类 号：B565.5[哲学宗教—外国哲学] B82-061