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作 者:黄可 万倩倩 周军[1] HUANG Ke;WAN Qian-qian;ZHOU Jun(School of Economics,WUT,Wuhan 430070,Hubei,China)
机构地区:[1]武汉理工大学经济学院
出 处:《武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2019年第6期108-115,共8页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition
摘 要:上市公司董事会特征与控制权私人收益水平的高低有着密切的联系。以2013-2017年中国中小板上市公司数据为样本测得其控制权私人收益平均值为11.82%,并对影响控制权私人收益的公司董事会特征因素作多变量线性回归分析。实证结果显示:(1)董事长和总经理两职分离对控制权私人收益具有抑制作用;(2)独立董事比例与控制权私人收益负相关,但不显著。同时,探究了管理层激励在公司董事会特征对控制权私人收益影响过程中的中介效应,结果表明,管理层股权激励在两职合一对控制权私人收益的影响过程中具有中介效应。The characteristics of the board of directors of listed companies are closely related to the level of private income of control.Based on the data of China’s small and medium-sized listed companies from 2013 to 2017,the average private income of control is 11.82%,and the multivariate linear regression analysis is made on the characteristics of the board of directors of the company that affects the private benefits of control.The empirical results show that:(1)the separation of the two positions of chairman and general manager has a restraining effect on the private benefits of control;(2)the proportion of independent directors is negatively correlated with the private benefits of control,but not significant.At the same time,it explores the mediating effect of management incentives in the process of the influence of the company’s board of directors on the private benefits of control.The results show that the management equity incentives have a mediating effect in the process of the two-person joint control private benefits.
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