大学生评教行为的博弈论研究  

A Study of the Teacher-Evaluating Behavior of College Students: Based on Game Theory

作　　者：孙鳌[1] 孙由之 SUN Ao;SUN You-zhi(Southern Medical University,Guangzhou Guangdong 510515;China University of Mining&Technology,Beijing 100083)

机构地区：[1]南方医科大学经济学系,广东广州510515 [2]中国矿业大学(北京)英语系,北京100083

出　　处：《广东技术师范学院学报》2019年第5期44-50,共7页Journal of Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University

基　　金：广东省普通高校教育科研项目“高等教育的变革：从评教到教的咨询”(项目编号：2016GXJK025)

摘　　要：在教师各种利益与学生评教分数捆绑的政策下,在学生评教中,学生将采取“如果感知到教师执行严格的学术标准,就给教师打低分;反之,如果感知到教师执行宽松的学术标准,就给教师打高分”的策略,预期到这一点的教师会主动降低学术标准,以讨好学生和最大化其学生评教分数。教师和学生行为的双重扭曲必然导致课程分数和学生评教分数的双重膨胀,最终严重损害高校的绩效和声誉。其解决办法是,解除教师利益与学生评教分数的捆绑,并且,改变学生评教的用途,把其变成教育咨询的一个环节,以实现高校从教师绩效评价到教师绩效管理的根本变革。Given the policy of bundling teachers’interests with the student-evaluation-of-teaching,in their evaluation of teaching,students will adopt the strategy that the teacher who has been implementing a strict grading policy will be given low score,and those who has been implementing a loose grading policy will be given a high score.Expecting this,the teacher will be likely to lower the academic standard for students to satisfy his or her student and to maximize students’evaluation score of teaching.Such dual distortion of teacher grading behavior and student grading behavior inevitably results in the dual inflation of the students’evaluation score and the course grade,thus damaging the university’s performance and reputation severely in the end.The solution is to remove the bundling between the teacher’s interests and the student’s evaluation of teaching,and to alter the use of student evaluation of teaching in order to make it a link in teaching consultation.The ultimate purpose of this practice is to achieve a fundamental reform from the teacher performance appraisal to the teacher performance management.

关 键 词：学生评教 评分行为 讨好策略 博弈论研究 

分 类 号：G420[文化科学—课程与教学论]