腐败治理能改善国企高管双重激励的效率吗?——基于高官落马视角的实证研究  

Can Anti-corruption Improve the Efficiency of Dual Incentives for SOEs Executives?——An Empirical Study from the Perspective of Detained Officials

作　　者：覃予[1] 李宗彦 Qin Yu;Li Zongyan(School of Economics and Management,Zhejiang Sci-Tech University,Hangzhou 310018,China;School of Accounting,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2020年第1期22-33,共12页Contemporary Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602179);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(16YJC630108);浙江省哲学社会科学基金项目(16JDGH087)

摘　　要：基于A股301家国有上市公司2010-2016年的平衡面板数据,检验了反腐败治理中高官落马如何改变国企高管显性货币薪酬与隐性超额在职消费对公司业绩的激励效率。结果表明,与央企的双重激励对公司业绩始终无明显影响不同,位于高官落马人数越多地区的地方国企,其超额在职消费对业绩的激励效率越高,但高管货币薪酬的激励效率却越低,且该现象突出体现在党的十八大后。这是因为地方国企高管在高官落马的震慑下更倾向于用显性激励替代隐性激励。进一步研究表明,在高官落马人数多的地区,地方国企的超额在职消费可通过提高投资效率最终实现业绩增长。文章结论表明,反腐败仅是提高国企隐性激励效率的治标之策,只有同时完善内部治理环境,方能从根本上提高国企高管整体激励效率。Based on the balanced panel data of 301 state-owned A-share companies in 2010-2016,the article tests how detained officials have changed the incentive efficiency of SOEs executives’ explicit monetary compensation and implicit excess perk on companies’ performance. The results show that the incentive efficiency of executives’ monetary compensation is weakened,while the perk of local SOEs is more effective in improving the company’s performance in the areas where the number of detained officials is larger. And this only happened after 18 th CPC National Congress. However,the dual incentives of the central SOEs have not had such significant impact on the companies’ performance. This is because the executives of local SOEs tend to use explicit incentives to replace the implicit incentives under the deterrence of the anti-corruption war. Further research shows that the perk of local SOEs can ultimately promote the growth of the company’s performance by improving investment efficiency in areas where there are a large number of detained officials. The conclusion is that anti-corruption is only a superficial measure to improve the efficiency of implicit incentive in SOEs.Only by establishing a sound internal governance environment can the SOE executives’ overall incentive efficiency be improved.

关 键 词：高官落马 在职消费 货币薪酬 国有企业 震慑效应 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济]