两权分离制度下高新企业如何选择最优激励方式?  

How to Choose the Best Incentives for High-tech Enterprises under the Separation of Two Powers?

作　　者：姬新龙 高山 李翎 JI Xin-long;GAO Shan;LI Ling(School of Finance,Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics,Lanzhou Gansu 730020)

机构地区：[1]兰州财经大学金融学院

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2020年第1期73-81,共9页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目“混合所有制改革与国有企业资本结构的动态优化研究”(项目编号:19XJC630008)

摘　　要：运用2013-2017沪深两交易所所有A、B股上市的高科技企业的财务数据,分析企业绩效和企业风险因为不同的高管激励方式所带来的影响,实证研究结果表明:不同指标计量的企业绩效下股权激励大于货币薪酬激励;高管股权激励对风险承担的影响大于货币激励对风险承担的影响;随着企业绩效的增加,高管更倾向于高风险项目,企业风险也会变大。在薪酬上对公司高管进行激励,能够提升其工作积极性,生产效率明显提高,企业业绩更佳,研究结论能够为高管激励考核机制的完善提供参考,使高管业绩评价体系更加多元化。Using the financial data of listed companies related to all high-tech companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2013 to 2017, to analyze the impact of corporate performance and corporate risk caused by different executive incentive methods, the results of the study show that: Equity incentives are greater than monetary compensation incentives for corporate performance measured by different indicators;executive equity incentives have a greater impact on risk taking than monetary incentives on risk taking;as corporate performance increases, executives are more inclined to high risk project, corporate risk will also increase. Incentives on company executives on remuneration can improve their enthusiasm for work, significantly improve production efficiency, and better corporate performance. The research conclusions can provide a reference for the improvement of the incentive evaluation mechanism for executives, and make the executive performance evaluation system more diversified.

关 键 词：股权激励 货币激励 企业风险 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F272.5[经济管理—企业管理]