双重声誉下银行对B2B平台的激励机制设计  

Bank’s Incentive Mechanism Design for B2B Platform under Dual Reputation

作　　者：杨琦峰[1] 高亚婷 宋平[1] YANG Qi-feng;GAO Ya-ting;SONG Ping(School of Economics,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学经济学院

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第1期20-29,共10页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71233006);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473186)

摘　　要：市场声誉无法实现对B2B平台的长期激励,为了抑制B2B平台的长期道德风险,构建引入市场声誉和内部声誉的两期委托代理模型,利用逆向归纳法求解两期合作下双重声誉的激励效果,并对比分析考虑内部声誉与否对激励契约的影响。研究发现:市场声誉仅能抑制B2B平台的短期道德风险,内部声誉能抑制B2B平台的短期和长期道德风险,但内部声誉短期激励效应弱于市场声誉的短期激励效应;双重声誉下的激励机制能解决市场声誉无法实现长期激励的问题,并弥补内部声誉短期激励不足的缺陷。因此,银行基于双重声誉设计激励机制更为合理有效。The market reputation cannot achieve long-term incentives for the B2B platform.In order to suppress the long-term moral hazard of the B2B platform,a two-stage principal-agent model that introduces market reputation and internal reputation is constructed.The inverse induction method is used to solve the incentive effect of the dual reputation under the two-phase cooperation,and the impact of internal reputation on the incentive contract is also compared and analyzed.It is found that market reputation can only suppress the shortterm moral hazard of B2B platform,while internal reputation can inhibit the short-term and long-term moral hazard of B2B platform,but its short-term incentive effect is worse than that of market reputation;the incentive mechanism under dual reputation can solve the problem that market reputation cannot realize the long-term incentives and can make up for the shortcomings of short-term incentives for internal reputation.Therefore,the incentive mechanism based on dual reputation is more reasonable and effective for banks.

关 键 词：双重声誉 卖方电子订单 委托代理 激励机制 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F832.2[经济管理—国民经济]