基于综合激励模型的家庭医生签约服务激励机制构建  

Construction of Incentive Mechanism for Family Doctor Contracted Services Based on Comprehensive Incentive Model

作　　者：王媚楠 赵盼盼 王屹亭[1] 林振平[1] 钱东福[1] WANG Meinan;ZHAO Panpan;WANG Yiting;LIN Zhenping;QIAN Dongfu(Institute of Healthy Jiangsu Development/Research Center for Gneeral Practice/School of Health Policy and ManagementN,anjing Medical University,Nanjing 210029,China)

机构地区：[1]南京医科大学健康江苏研究院,全科医学研究中心,医政学院,江苏省南京市210029

出　　处：《中国全科医学》2020年第12期1523-1528,共6页Chinese General Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71874085)。

摘　　要：本文通过对国内外家庭医生签约服务激励机制进行梳理,分析国内家庭医生签约服务激励机制存在的问题,发现家庭医生签约服务激励机制在理论研究上的不足。在综合借鉴分析综合激励模型的基础上,构建了基于综合激励的家庭医生签约服务激励模型,提出通过物质激励与精神激励相结合、内在激励与外在激励相结合、正激励与负激励相结合、个人激励与团队激励相结合,完善配套措施等综合激励策略。This paper sorts out the incentive mechanism of family doctor contracted services at home and abroad,analyzes the problems existing in the incentive mechanism of domestic family doctor contracted services,and finds that the incentive mechanism is insufficient in theoretical research.On the basis of comprehensively analyzing the comprehensive incentive model,this paper constructs a family doctor contacted service incentive model based on comprehensive incentive model.It is proposed a combination of material incentives and spiritual incentives,internal incentives and external incentives,positive incentives and negative incentives,individual incentives and team incentives,and the improvement of supporting measures and other incentive strategies.

关 键 词：卫生政策 综合激励模型 全科医生 签约服务 激励机制 

分 类 号：R197[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]