高管内部薪酬差距、经营风险与企业研发投入  

Top Manager Pay Dispersion,Business Risk and R&D Expenditure

作　　者：康华[1,2] 程成 朱文璟 KANG Hua;CHENG Cheng;ZHU Wen-jing(School of Economics and Management,Xi’an University of Technology,Xi’an 710054,China;Postdoctoral Station of Management Sciences and Engineering,Xi’an University of Technology,Xi’an 710054,China)

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054 [2]西安理工大学管理科学与工程博士后流动站,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《预测》2020年第1期51-58,共8页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472151);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2014M552472)。

摘　　要：如何激励风险厌恶型的高管开展高风险的研发活动一直都是技术创新领域的重要研究问题。本文基于“不患寡而患不均”的文化背景,以2007~2018年上市公司为样本,实证考察了我国企业高管之间内部薪酬差距对企业研发投入的影响以及经营风险对上述关系的调节效应。研究发现,第一,整体而言,CEO级与VP级高管(副总经理级)的薪酬差距与研发投入显著负相关;第二,经营风险会显著调节CEO级与VP级高管的薪酬差距与企业研发投入之间的关系;第三,经营风险对CEO级与VP级高管的薪酬差距与研发投入之间关系的调节效应在国有企业和民营企业中显著不同;第四,基于国企子样本的进一步研究发现,经营风险对CEO级与VP级高管的薪酬差距与企业研发投入之间关系的调节效应在央企、省属国企和市县国企中显著不同。How to motivate the risk-aversion top managers to take risky R&D activity is an important problem of technology innovation research.So,under the culturalbackground of fairness preference,this paper investigates the impact of pay dispersion between CEO and VPs on R&D expenditure with a pooled data sample of the Chinese listed companies for the period 2007~2018.The results show that:firstly,the pay dispersion between CEO and VPs is significantly negative to R&D expenditure;secondly,the business risk is the moderator of the relationship between pay dispersion between CEO and VPs and R&D expenditure;thirdly,the moderating effect of business riskiness is significantly different between SOE and Non-SOE;finally,the moderating effect of business risk is significantly different in central government SOE,provincial SOE and municipal and county SOE.

关 键 词：薪酬差距 研发投入 经营风险 产权性质 政府层级 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]