经理人相对绩效评价与企业并购行为:理论与实证  

Relative Performance Evaluation and Mergers and Acquisitions:Theory and Empirical Evidence

作　　者：李广众[1,2] 朱佳青 李杰 LI Guangzhong;ZHU Jiaqing;LI Jie;LI Xinchun(Sun Yat-Sen University;Guangdong University of Foreign Studies;Southern China Institute of Fortune Management Research;Jinan University)

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,510275 [2]中山大学高级金融研究院,510275 [3]广东外语外贸大学金融学院,510006 [4]华南财富管理中心研究基地 [5]暨南大学产业经济研究院,510632

出　　处：《经济研究》2020年第3期65-82,共18页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金国际(地区)合作与交流项目(71810107002);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772190);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71903040);国家自然科学基金科学中心集成项目(U1811462);暨南大学宁静致远“跨越计划”项目(19JNKY02);中山大学高级金融研究院的资助。

摘　　要：本文通过构建寡头市场竞争模型对经理人相对绩效评价(RPE)如何影响企业并购行为进行理论分析。结果表明,在其他条件不变的情况下,RPE实施与强度的增加将抑制具有协同效应的并购行为。市场竞争程度的上升可以减弱这种负面作用。实证研究中,本文利用国务院国有资产监督管理委员会2006年与2008年发布的中央企业绩效评价管理改革的文件作为企业实施相对绩效评价的外生事件,对RPE影响企业并购的效果进行双重差分估计。与理论模型的结论一致,实证研究发现RPE抑制了国有企业并购行为的发生,同时国企并购对提升公司价值的积极作用随着RPE的实施与强度的上升有所减弱。基于股权激励的公司治理手段以及行业竞争程度的上升可以减弱这种抑制作用。本文为当前国有企业经理人绩效考核机制设计及其经济后果提供了理论分析与经验证据。Relative performance evaluation(RPE)is an evaluation design in which the principal rewards or punishes an agent based on his or her performance relative to the performance of his or her peers.RPE is widely used in practice.In China,the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council(SASAC)issued compendiums in 2006 and 2008 mandating the use of RPEs in evaluating the executives of state-owned enterprises(SOEs),with the aim of promoting manager-shareholder incentive alignment.Although some researchers have posited that RPEs can enhance managers' incentives to increase shareholder wealth by promoting risk sharing and incentive alignment,the real economic consequences of RPEs warrant further research.Studies have examined the effects of RPEs on various corporate decisions,including CEO compensation,CEO turnover,industry competition,and firms' strategic accounting disclosure.This study extends the seminal work of Salent et al.(1983)in this area and examines the impact of RPEs on corporate merger and acquisition(M&A)decisions,a particular form of corporate investment.Specifically,we examine the impact of RPEs on corporate M&As in an oligopolistic model setting.In the model,an agent s utility is assumed to be a function of the firm's profit and that of its rivals.Thus,managers' merger decisions are linked to the firm's relative performance.We document that RPEs can result in an agent s utility being affected by M&A decisions in four ways.First,the synergy effect improves the merged entity s performance and increases the agent's utility.Second,the internalized competition between the merging firms benefits the merged firm and increases the agent's utility.Third,the positive externality effect on the non-merged firms from reduced competition may damage the merged firms performance and decrease the agent's utility.Finally,the positive externality to the non-merged firms decreases the agent's utility because of the RPE.As a result,we find that ceteris paribus,implementing and strengthening

关 键 词：相对绩效评价 企业并购 公司治理 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济] F276.1