萨特论想象——兼谈对想象和知觉的现象学区分  

Sartre on Imagination——An Attached Discussion About the Phenomenological Differentiation Between Imagination and Perception

作　　者：赵桂梅 Zhao Guimei(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《保定学院学报》2020年第2期9-15,共7页Journal of Baoding University

摘　　要：休谟通过对印象和观念的划分,将想象视为一种微弱的知觉,并主张二者只存在程度上的差异。通过批判性地考察休谟的想象理论,萨特指出,在知觉和影像之间具有本质差异,想象不是一种微弱的知觉,更不是一个物,而是一种意识活动。想象以四种方式来设定其对象不存在,揭示了想象本身所蕴含的一种否定性和虚无。而想象及其对象的非现实性和否定性使之与知觉从本质上区分开来,进而表明想象意识较于知觉意识所具有的自发性、创造性和自由性。Through the division of impression and idea,Hume thinks imagination as a weak perception and argues that there is only a degree of difference between them.By critically examining Hume’s imaginary theory,Sartre points out that there is an essential difference between perception and image.Imagination is not a weak perception,let alone an object,but an activity of consciousness.Imagination assumes that its object does not exist in four ways,which reveals a kind of negativity and nothingness contained in imagination itself.The unreality and negativity of imagination and its objects distinguish it from perception,which in turn indicates that the imaginary consciousness is more spontaneous,creative and free than the perceptual consciousness.

关 键 词：萨特 知觉 想象 意识活动 非现实性 

分 类 号：B565.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]