真实盈余管理、产权性质与创新绩效  

Real Earnings Management,Property Rights and Innovation Performance

作　　者：朱湘忆 ZHU Xiang-yi

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院 [2]山东理工大学管理学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2020年第5期53-64,共12页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：山东省社会科学规划项目“模块化生产网络价值创新助力新旧动能转换研究”(项目编号:18CKJJ26);山东省自然科学基金“一带一路倡议下我国会计师事务所自控国际网络建设研究”(项目编号:ZR2019MG034)。

摘　　要：研发投资直接影响上市公司创新,同时削减研发支出也是经理人常用的盈余管理方法,因此保持创新绩效与迎合盈余阈值能否兼顾成为一个值得探索的问题。本文采用2007—2016年中国A股非金融类上市公司数据,从创新视角实证检验了真实盈余管理的经济后果。研究发现,真实盈余管理研发减少对创新产出的抑制程度比其他研发减少严重,其中非国有企业的真实盈余管理可能更加不利于创新产出,相较之下经理人实施其他研发减少行为则可以提高创新效率。进一步研究表明,业绩薪酬对创新绩效具有消极影响,而股权激励能够促使经理人提高创新产出。研究结论对有关部门调整政策和经理人薪酬契约,促进技术创新提出了有价值的建议。R&D investment directly affects the innovation of listed companies.Meanwhile cutting R&D expenditure is also a common earnings management method for managers.Therefore,it is worth discussing how to maintain the innovation performance and cater to the earnings threshold.Using the data of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2016,this study empirically tests the economic consequences of real earnings management from the perspective of innovation.The research found that the R&D reduction of real earnings management will more seriously inhibit the innovation output than the other R&D reduction,in which the real earnings management of non-state-owned enterprises may be more detrimental to innovation output.By contrast,managers can improve the innovation efficiency by implementing the other R&D reduction behaviors.Further research shows that performance compensation has a negative impact on innovation perfor-mance,while equity incentive can guide managers to improve innovation output.The conclusions of this study provide valuable suggestions for the relevant departments to adjust policies and managers'compensation contract in order to promote innovation.

关 键 词：真实盈余管理 创新绩效 产权性质 薪酬契约 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]