融资融券与高管薪酬契约有效性研究  

A research on securities margin trading and the effectiveness of executive compensation contract

作　　者：洪昀[1] 谌珊 姚靠华[1] Hong Yun;Shen Shan;Yao Kaohua(School of Business Administration,Hunan University,Changsha 410082,Hunan,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《科研管理》2020年第4期229-238,共10页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金:“大股东股权质押、择时行为与市值操纵研究”(71602054,2017.01-2019.12);湖南省自然科学基金:“通才-专才型高管、企业决策及其经济后果研究”(2017JJ3043,2017-2019)。

摘　　要：融资融券制度作为近年来中国资本市场重大改革之一,其对实体经济的影响尚未得到重视。本文使用双重差分模型研究了融资融券对高管激励的影响。实证结果表明,相对控制样本,标的公司的高管薪酬-经营业绩以及市场业绩敏感度在融资融券交易开通后上升更为显著,说明融资融券提升了企业会计信息及市场价格信息质量,从而有助于提高薪酬契约的有效性,具有显著外部治理效应;进一步的机理检验发现,融资融券效用发挥在治理机制较弱的制度环境中更为显著,表明其作为一种替代性的外部治理机制而发挥作用。The impact of financial market on the real economy is one of the most important problems in financial economics. The securities margin trading was officially launched in China on March 31, 2010, which end the history of "unilateral market" in China′s capital market. As a financial innovation tool, the implementation of margin trading system is one of the most important reforms in China′s capital market in recent years, and is regarded as a booster to promote the effective development of China′s capital market. Extant domestic research mainly focus on the impact of margin trading on the efficiency of financial market. More importantly, the reform of the secondary financial market should also have a profound impact on the real economy, but this string of literature is still lacking. Our study will explore the governance effect of margin trading from the perspective of executive compensation.Working as the core mechanism of corporate governance system, executive compensation system is designed to reduce the agency problem, and hence improve the performance and wealth of shareholders. How to improve the compensation contract effectiveness is of great importance for the firms. According to the theory of optimal contract, a compensation system that link to the performance could help to motivate managers to work hard, which is also the optimal equilibrium when the monitoring cost is very high. However, an effective compensation system needs high-quality performance indexes. High quality means that the index is a performance measurement with low noise and could track the managers′ efforts accurately. Previous studies find that the margin trading can improve the information efficiency, information content and earnings quality of the individual stock market price, indicating that the basic indexes on which executive compensation contracts depend will become more effective. Therefore, the executive compensation contract could become more effective after the introduction of margin trading, and the contract should put

关 键 词：融资融券 高管薪酬 薪酬业绩敏感性 公司治理 双重差分模型 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]