管理者自利行为与税负粘性——基于深沪A股上市公司的经验证据  

Management Self-interest and Tax Expense Stickiness:Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

作　　者：孔墨奇 唐建新[1] 陈冬[1] KONG Moqi;TANG Jianxin;CHEN Dong(Economics & Management School of Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2020年第3期103-108,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102159);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(16YJC790005)。

摘　　要：基于2009-2017年的中国A股上市公司面板数据,探讨企业内部管理者行为和企业的税负粘性现象之间的关系。结果显示:企业利润每上升1%,税负增加0.55%;企业利润每下降1%,税负减少0.20%。管理者自利程度和企业税负粘性呈正相关,管理者自利程度越高,企业税负粘性越大。同时,公司税负粘性现象会影响到未来企业价值,企业税负粘性越大,其企业价值越低。Based on data of Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2017,we attempt to explain the phenomenon of tax expense stickiness from managers'behavior on corporate performance.We found that tax expenses increase on average by 0.55%per 1%increase in profit,but decrease by only 0.20%per 1%in profit and the degree of self-interest of managers is positively correlated with the tax expense stickiness.Further research shows that the phenomenon of corporate tax expense stickiness will affect the future firm value.The greater the corporate tax expense stickiness is,the lower the firm value is.

关 键 词：税负粘性 避税 管理者自利 企业价值 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]