国有企业政府隐性担保对社会资源非对称影响效应研究  

Research on the Asymmetric Effect of State-Owned Enterprise Government Implied Guarantee on Social Resources

作　　者：李腊生[1] 陈洋洋 李军帅 LI La-sheng;CHEN Yang-yang;LI Jun-shuai(School of Statistics Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China)

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学统计学院,天津300222

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2020年第4期3-15,共13页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71972140)。

摘　　要：本文以我国A股上市公司为研究对象,以国有上市公司为研究样本,在运用KMV模型估计了2010年以前上市的所有企业的违约概率的基础上,通过PSM模型对国企与民企进行匹配分析,考察国有企业的隐性担保强度及其影响因素,研究结果发现:(1)政府隐性担保会通过信用增级的形式增加国有企业信用;(2)财政能力、辖级国有企业数量和行政层级都是影响国有企业政府隐性担保转化为国有企业信用增级的因素;(3)政府隐性担保通过国有企业信用增级形式加强了社会资源的倾斜分布,对社会资源配置所产生的非对称影响,降低了社会资源配置效率。This article takes China’s A-share listed companies as the research object and stateowned listed companies as the research sample.Based on the default probabilities of all companies listed before 2010 estimated by KMV models,the PSM model is used to match the state-owned and private enterprises.By examining the strength of implicit guarantees of state-owned enterprises and their influencing factors,it was found that:(1)implicit government guarantees can increase the credit of state-owned enterprises through the form of credit enhancement;(2)financial capacity,number of state-owned enterprises at the administrative level,administrative level are factors that affect the conversion of government implicit guarantees of state-owned enterprises into credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises;(3)government implicit guarantees strengthen the inclined distribution of social resources through the form of credit enhancement of state-owned enterprises,and it has an asymmetric impact on social resource allocation and reduces the efficiency of social resource allocation.

关 键 词：KMV模型 PSM模型 政府隐性担保 资源不均衡分布 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]