高管薪酬存在同伴效应吗?  

Is There a Peer Effect in Executive Compensation?

作　　者：潘子成 PAN Zicheng(School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,China)

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2020年第5期62-76,共15页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“媒体披露、管理层策略选择与市场反应”(71472091);国家自然科学基金青年项目“媒体报道与股价波动:中国情境下的说服理论视角研究”(71102025)。

摘　　要：以2007—2017年间沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,重点探讨了高管薪酬同伴效应的存在性、情境因素以及经济后果。研究发现,高管薪酬同时存在行业和区域同伴效应。而且,上述薪酬同伴效应在环境不确定性程度和非国有控股程度高的公司中更为显著。此外,高管薪酬同伴效应与企业发展的关系因时而异,即短期内可促进企业的发展,但中长期则抑制了企业的发展。进一步发现,模仿是解释薪酬同伴效应的内在逻辑。另外,薪酬同伴效应降低了薪酬业绩敏感性。研究不仅在理论上丰富了高管薪酬的研究内容,同时为高管薪酬方案的制定以及同伴效应外部性的运用提供了指导和借鉴。By taking all the A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2017 as the research samples,this article mainly focuses on the existence,situational factors,and economic consequences of the peer effect of executive compensation.The results show that there exists a peer effect of executive compensation in both the industry and the region.In addition,the above peer effect of compensation is more obvious in companies with high degree of environmental uncertainty and proportion of non-state ownership.Besides,the relationship between the peer effect of executive compensation and enterprise development is different as the time changes.Specifically,while the peer effect can promote the development of enterprises in the short term,it restrains the development of enterprises in the long run.It is further found that imitation is the internal logic to explain the peer effect of compensation.In addition,the peer effect of compensation reduces the pay-performance sensitivity.Not only does this research enrich the content system and existing literature for executive compensation in theory,but also provides a guidance and reference for the formulation of executive compensation plan of listed companies and the application of the externality of peer effect.

关 键 词：同伴效应 高管薪酬 企业发展 模仿 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]