统一授信模式下基于道德风险的收益分配模型  

Profit Distribution Model Based on Moral Hazards in the Unified Credit Mode

作　　者：李丽君[1] 衣峻林 程富 LI Li-jun;YI Jun-lin;CHENG Fu(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110169

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2020年第6期896-901,共6页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71802044);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N170601006)。

摘　　要：存货质押融资统一授信模式下,银行与物流企业间的信息不对称易使物流企业产生授信审查不努力道德风险,银行作为委托人需要设计激励机制加以防范,收益分配作为一种激励机制,可以对道德风险起到约束作用.基于存货质押统一授信模式,考虑物流企业授信审查不努力道德风险,运用委托代理理论研究银行对物流企业的激励问题,构建银行收益分配模型,得到最优收益分配比例决策,并通过数值算例分析了最优收益分配比例变动趋势.研究表明,存在最优收益分配比例使物流企业投入最优努力水平,实现双方联合收益最大化.In the unified credit mode of inventory pledge financing,logistics enterprises may undergo moral hazards of less efforts in credit reviewing because of the information asymmetry between them and banks,and banks as clients need to design incentive mechanisms to prevent moral hazards.As an incentive mechanism,profit distribution can play a certain role in restraining moral hazards.Considering the moral hazards of logistics enterprises,based on the principal-agent theory,the incentive problem of banks to logistics enterprises was studied,the profit distribution model was established and the optimal profit distribution proportion was obtained,and the changing trend of optimal profit distribution proportions by numerical examples was analyzed.It was shown that the optimal profit distribution proportion enables logistics enterprises to invest the best effort level and realize the maximization of combined benefits for both banks and logistics enterprises.

关 键 词：存货质押融资 统一授信模式 道德风险 激励机制 收益分配 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]