“别子为宗”:本我论还是唯我论?——论卡西尔对海德格尔真理观的“唯我论责难”  

Is Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology of Dasein a Philosophical Solipsism?On Cassirer-Heidegger Davos Debate of Philosophical Solipsism

作　　者：王庆节 WANG Qingjie

机构地区：[1]澳门大学哲学与宗教研究系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2020年第3期66-73,195,196,共10页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：澳门大学资助(项目编号:SRG2019-00176-FAH)。

摘　　要：在著名的达沃斯论辩中,卡西尔责难海德格尔《存在与时间》中的以“有限存在人”为立足点和出发点的基础存在论立场。他批评海德格尔对康德的解释在真理问题上把自己逼入哲学上的主观唯我论和主观相对主义。结果,这和康德哲学旨在通过“纯粹理性的批判”来达到和保证科学知识的普遍和必然真理性的目标背道而驰。但在海德格尔看来,以新康德主义,例如卡西尔的“文化哲学”为代表的这类康德解释以“知识人”为发问起点,这就阻碍和遮蔽了人们去看到在康德人的知识能力“问题”背后的“存在问题”或“存在疑难”。相形之下,海德格尔的基础存在论以“存在人”为起点的发问,则直接引向了“存在疑难”的发问和开显。正是这一发问和开显,同时在根基上彻底“动摇”和“瓦解”了传统哲学以“判断”和“知识”为核心来思考真理问题的思路。这不仅避开了哲学唯我论的陷阱,而且更触发和激发人们去思考和发问“真理”“普遍”“客观”“永恒”这些“价值”得以成立的源头,从而通过对亲在的生存论分析工作,进入或者深入到对“形而上学疑难”的发问。Cassirer charges against Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in Being and Time that starts from Dasein as“a finite existing being,”and says that Heidegger’s conception of truth will be driven into philosophical solipsism.This leads Heidegger’s Kant interpretation not only to a“usurp”of Kant himself but also to a dead end of any serious philosophical thinking.The current essay tries to reconstruct Heidegger’s answer to this charge in the well-known Davos’debate.According to Heidegger,the typical Neo-Kantian epistemological approach of Kant behind Cassirer’s charge takes an ontological understanding of the nature of human being as a“knowing being”rather than an“ek-isting being”.It thus blocks our understanding of Kant’s primordial and major concern behind his works of the three Critiques as an attempt of rebuilding a metaphysics of human existence.Therefore,without a way of the fundamental ontology of Dasein,Heidegger argues,we could not really think and ask about the origin and the essence of the traditional philosophical concepts such as“truth”,“value”,“universal”,“objective”,and“eternity”,so as to enter or deepen an investigation of the“metaphysical problems”of“being”and human existence.

关 键 词：达沃斯论辩 海德格尔 卡西尔 唯我论 本我论 真理 

分 类 号：B5[哲学宗教—外国哲学]