作为动力之知的儒家“体知”论——杜维明对当代道德认识论的贡献  

Tu Weiming’s Tizhi as Knowing-to:Confucian Contribution to Contemporary Moral Epistemology

作　　者：黄勇[1] 黄家光(译) HUANG Yong

机构地区：[1]香港中文大学哲学系 [2]温州大学人文学院 [3]华东师范大学知识与行动中心

出　　处：《哲学分析》2020年第3期101-116,196,197,共18页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“伦理学知识体系的当代中国重建”(项目编号:2019ZDA033)。

摘　　要：“体知”是杜维明提出的一个重要概念,用来说明儒家传统所强调的一种特殊的知识类型。这种知识类型在宋明儒学中被称作“德性之知”,而与“闻见之知”相区别。这种知识有两个主要特征:一方面,要获得这样的知识,不能只靠理智的认知活动,还需要有内心的体验活动;另一方面,这样的知识不只让其拥有者知道孰是孰非,而且还会让他好是恶非、行是除非。这种知识类型既与西方传统认识论强调的命题性知识(knowing-that)不同,也与20世纪中叶为赖尔所强调的能力之知(knowing-how)不同。就其能够驱使其拥有者做出与这种知识相应的行动而言,它是一种动力之知(knowing-to);就这种知识不只是信念(belief)而且也是欲望(desire)而言,它是一种信欲(besire)。在这个意义上,作为动力之知的“体知”概念的提出是对当代认识论特别是道德认识论的一个重要贡献。Tizhi is an important idea that Tu Weiming has developed to explain the unique type of knowing emphasized in the Confucian tradition,which is called knowledge of/as virtue,in contrast to knowing of hearing and seeing,in the neo-Confucian tradition in the Song-Ming dynasties.This type of knowledge has two unique features.On the one hand,it can be acquired not merely through cognitive activities of the mind but also relies upon inner experiences of the heart.One the other hand,as normative knowledge,it not only tells its possessor what is right and what is wrong but also motivates the possessor to do what is right and avoid what is wrong.This type of knowledge is not only different from knowledge-that,to which epistemology in the Western philosophical tradition has paid exclusive attention,but also different from knowledge-how,to which Gilbert Ryle called our attention in 1950s.In the sense that it motivates its possessor to act accordingly,it may be regarded as knowledge-to;and in the sense that it is not only a belief but also a desire,it may be called besire.Thus understood,the concept of tizhi as knowledge-to makes a great contribution to contemporary epistemology in general and moral epistemology in particular.

关 键 词：体知 德性之知 动力之知 杜维明 

分 类 号：B94[哲学宗教—宗教学]