高管薪酬激励契约与会计科目归类操纵——基于一项准自然实验的证据  

Incentive Contract of Executive Compensation and Classified Manipulation of Accounting Discipline:Evidence Based on a Quasi-natural Experiment

作　　者：叶康涛[1] 刘雨柔 Ye Kangtao;Liu Yurou

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《复印报刊资料（财务与会计导刊）（理论版）》2019年第12期20-30,共11页FINANCE & ACCOUNTING GUIDE

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目“制度变革、非正式制度因素与会计审计行为研究”(71790602);国家自然科学基金项目“财务报告舞弊的劳动力市场后果”(71872176);教育部人文社会科学规划项目“中央八项规定与在职消费归类操纵行为研究”(16YJA790059)。

摘　　要：基于2006年国资委对《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》进行修订所提供的自然实验机会,考察了会计科目归类操纵对高管薪酬激励的影响。以2005~2009年A股上市公司为样本,采用双重差分模型,研究发现,在央企负责人业绩考核办法变更后,央企通过会计科目归类操纵将非经常性收益计入经常性损益的行为显著增加。进一步分析表明,存在会计科目归类操纵嫌疑的央企主营业务并未呈现出持续改善的迹象,再次支持了会计科目归类操纵假说。此外,研究还发现会计科目归类操纵程度与高管薪酬呈显著的正相关关系,表明高管利用会计科目归类操纵获得了薪酬收益。因此,监管部门在制定央企业绩考核办法时,应考虑会计科目归类操纵的可能影响,尽可能将薪酬业绩指标基于企业不易进行科目归类操纵的业绩指标;同时,通过加强会计和审计监管,来防范和抑制企业的会计科目归类操纵行为,以增强央企业绩考核办法的有效性。This paper utilizes a natural experiment setting arising from the change in the executive performance e-valuation policy for central government-owned enterprises(CGOE)in 2006 and examines the impact of accounting classification shifting on executive incentive contracts.Using a sample of Chinese listed companies during the years from 2005 to 2009 and a difference-indifferences approach,we find that CGOEs shift income from extraordinary items to core earnings after the policy change to boost core earnings.Further analyses suggest that CGOEs'core earnings do not improve in the subsequent periods,again supporting the accounting classification shifting hypothesis.Finally,we find that top executive compensations in CGOEs are positively associated with the extent of classification shifting,indicating that top executives boost their compensations through accounting classification shifting.Our findings have policy implications for the improvement of performance evaluation system in CGOEs,which is that SASAC should base the incentive contract on those accounting targets that are less subject to classification shifting,and strengthen the accounting&auditing supervision to prevent classification shifting behavior so as to enhance the effectiveness of CGOEs'performance evaluation methods.

关 键 词：非经常性收益 会计科目归类操纵 盈余管理 业绩考核 高管薪酬 央企 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]