外部薪酬攀比与企业绩效--基于管理层和普通员工双视角  

External Salary Comparison and Firm Performance——Based on management and ordinary employees

作　　者：刘维奇 张燕[2] LIU Wei-qi;ZHANG Yan(Institute of Management and Decision,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China;School of Finance,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China;School of Economics and Management,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China)

机构地区：[1]山西大学管理与决策研究所,山西太原030006 [2]山西财经大学金融学院,山西太原030006 [3]山西大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《中国软科学》2020年第5期104-117,共14页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BJY164)。

摘　　要：通过构建外部薪酬攀比度量指标探索不同群体薪酬攀比行为对企业绩效的影响及影响机制。研究发现:管理层和普通员工都存在外部薪酬攀比行为,且外部薪酬攀比对企业绩效的影响因企业属性而异、因值而异、因地而异,进一步,这种关系与管理层和普通员工外部薪酬公平感的同步性也有关。对普通员工而言,员工离职在外部薪酬攀比影响企业绩效中发挥中介效应,内部薪酬差增强了外部薪酬攀比对企业绩效的促进作用。对管理层而言,内部薪酬差的调节作用存在门槛效应。拓宽薪酬激励的研究范围,为企业有的放矢实行差异化薪酬制度提供了参考依据,为国家收入分配改革提供了微观证据。This paper constructs external salary comparison coefficient from the perspective of management and ordinary employees to discuss the influence and mechanism of external salary comparison behavior on enterprise performance based on comparison psychology.We find that,both managers and ordinary employees are affected by the external salary comparison,the higher the sense of external salary fairness the better for firm performance,the external salary comparison behavior of the ordinary employees is affected by the nature of the property rights of the enterprise,for ordinary employees,turnover plays a partial mediating effect in the impact of external salary comparison on firm performance,internal pay gap plays a positive regulatory role.Further research finds that the impact of external salary comparison on corporate performance varies with threshold value,place and person,and the synchronization of external salary fairness between management and ordinary employees.There is a threshold effect on the adjustment of the internal salary gap for management.This paper provides a new basis for firms to implement differentiated salary system,and micro-evidence for the reform of national income distribution.To a certain extent,it expands the research scope of salary incentive theory.

关 键 词：外部薪酬攀比 员工离职 内部薪酬差 产权性质 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理] F272.3[经济管理—国民经济]