萨特与存在问题  

Sartre and the Question of Being

作　　者：马迎辉 MA Ying-hui(Department of Philosophy,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310028,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学哲学系,杭州310028

出　　处：《江苏行政学院学报》2020年第3期21-27,共7页The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“《胡塞尔文集》中译”(12&ZD124)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：萨特接续了海德格尔思想"转向"后对存在何以可能的追问,不仅揭示了被胡塞尔所"遗漏"的基础问题,即纯粹意识何以绝对存在,而且通过揭示人在其焦虑意识中对海德格尔意义上的本源存在的构造的可能,维护了人在其自身虚化中自由地创造存在的权力。萨特没有遗忘存在,而是开辟出了人创造存在的新道路,海德格尔对萨特遗忘存在、深陷传统形而上学的批评是不合理的。Continuing Heidegger’s pursuit of the possibility of Being after his"mind shift",Sartre not only revealed the basic issue overlooked by Husserl——how can pure consciousness exists as an absolutely being,but also ascertained human rights of creating the Being in the freedom of self-nihilizing through the manifestation of the human capability to constitute the Heideggerian authentic Being in anxiety consciousness.Sartre did not forget the issue of Being,but opened up a new way for human to create Being.Heidegger’s critique of Sartre for forgetting Being and falling into traditional metaphysic is rootless.

关 键 词：纯粹意识 存在 虚无 焦虑 自由 

分 类 号：B516.5[哲学宗教—外国哲学]