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作 者:鲁渤 文一景 邢戬[3] 宋东平 Lu Bo;Moon Ilkyeong;Xing Jian;Song Dongping(School of Economics and Management,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024;Department of Industrial Engineering,Seoul National University,Seoul 08826;School of Economics and Management,Dalian University,Dalian 116622;School of Management,University of Liverpool,Liverpool L697ZH)
机构地区:[1]大连理工大学经济管理学院,大连116024 [2]韩国首尔大学工业工程学院,首尔08826 [3]大连大学经济管理学院,大连116622 [4]英国利物浦大学管理学院,利物浦L697ZH
出 处:《管理评论》2020年第7期246-257,共12页Management Review
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(71703011,71573028,71811540413,71811530337);中央高校基本科研业务费科研启动专项(DUT19RC(3)066);辽宁省经济社会发展研究课题(2020lslktyb-005);大连科技创新基金应用基础研究(2018J12GX034);大连市社科院智库重大调研课题(2019dlsky066)。
摘 要:港口作为开放系统,内外部多重因素共同形成了港口复杂系统的运行结构,导致其稳定状态跃迁具有随机性。本文以TEI@I方法论为基本理论框架和指导思想,将复杂系统分析方法论中的突变理论和博弈论进行有机结合,分析和预测环渤海港口在竞争与合作中的策略选择。首先,基于TEI@I方法论框架,本文应用因子旋转修正了突变理论,克服了以往基于突变理论的脆弱性研究出现的指标信息重叠和意义不明确问题。在综合分析了9大港口脆弱性以及各影响因子影响程度的基础上,本文在9大港口中选择了脆弱性处于同一区间、影响因子相同且恰好地理位置均处于环渤海地区,在客观上具备竞争与合作博弈条件的三个港口作为进一步博弈分析的参与人,弥补了现有研究中普遍存在的博弈参与人选择主观性较强的缺陷。在此基础上,基于TEI@I先分解后集成的思想,建立了博弈模型。研究发现,港口建设规模竞争方面,其他跟随港口是否选择建设升级策略取决于区域内带头港口企业能否获得超额利润;港口市场竞争方面,差异化经营和特色经营是关键策略;港口合作方面,合作后,参与合作与未参与合作港口均提高垄断利润,不利于区域经济长期发展。最后,模拟结果支持了博弈模型结论。环渤海港口群在发展中应加大港口建设规模、差异化经营和港口运营能力建设。As an open system,the internal and external factors together form the complex system operation structure of the port.This re-sults in a random state transition of the port system.This paper combines the catastrophe theory and game theory with TEI@I as the basic theoretical framework and guiding ideology to analyze and predict the strategic choice of the Bohai Sea port in competition and coopera-tion.On this basis,in order to overcome the problem of overlapping information and unclear meanings of the vulnerability research in the past catastrophe theory,we apply factor rotation to further modify the catastrophe theory.In this way,we measure the vulnerability of the nine major ports in China’s coastal areas and measure the impact of various factors.And use the conclusion of vulnerability measurement to select the game participants and the game strategy set.It makes up for the defects of subjectivity in the construction of existing game models.We find that in terms of port construction scale competition,whether other ports choose the strategy of upgrading depends on whether the leading port enterprises in the region can obtain excess profits;In terms of port market competition,differentiated manage-ment and characteristic management are key strategies;In terms of port cooperation,after cooperation,participation in cooperation and non-participation in cooperation ports increase monopoly profits,which is not conducive to the long-term development of regional econo-my.Finally,the simulation results support the conclusion of the game model.In the development of the Bohai Sea port group,the port construction scale,differentiated operation and port operation capacity construction should be increased.
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