企业绩效、管理层权力与高管薪酬研究  

Research on Corporate Performance,Management Power and Executive Compensation

作　　者：牛翠萍 任森春[1] 刘妍妍 NIU Cuiping;REN Senchun;LIU Yanyan(College of Business Administration,Anhui University of Finance&Economics,Bengbu 233030,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学金融学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《科技创业月刊》2020年第7期81-86,共6页Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology

摘　　要：基于沪深两市国企数据,研究实施新一轮高管薪酬改革后企业绩效和管理层权力对国企高管薪酬的影响。结果表明:①国企高管货币薪酬与企业绩效呈现显著正相关关系,企业业绩下降对国企高管货币薪酬与企业绩效之间关系起到负向调节作用,企业风险则对货币薪酬与企业绩效之间关系起到正向调节作用;国企高管的在职消费与企业绩效呈现负相关关系,企业业绩下降对国企高管在职消费与企业绩效之间关系起到正向调节作用,而企业风险则对在职消费与企业绩效之间关系起到负向调节作用。②国企高管货币薪酬与管理层权力呈现显著的正相关关系,国企高管在职消费与管理层权力呈现正相关关系;监事会规模与审计委员会均对货币薪酬与管理层权力之间关系、在职消费与管理层权力之间关系产生负向调节作用。③管理层权力与国企高管货币薪酬粘性之间存正相关关系;管理层权力与高管在职消费粘性之间存在正相关关系,但粘度均下降。This paper takes this policy event as the starting point of the research system,and based on the data of state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen,tests the impact of corporate performance and management power on the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises after the implementation of the new round of executive compensation reform.The results show that:(1)There is a significant positive correlation between the monetary compensation and corporate performance,and the decline in corporate performance plays a negative role in moderating the relationship between monetary compensation of sate-owned executives and corporate performance,and enterprise risk plays a positive role in moderating the relationship between monetary compensation of sate-owned executives and corporate performance;there is a negative correlation between the on-the-job consumption of state-owned executives and corporate performance,and the decline in corporate performance has a positive moderate effect on the relationship between on-the-job consumption of state-owned executives and corporate performance,while enterprise risk plays a negative role in moderating on-the-job consumption of state-owned executives and corporate performance.(2)There is a significant positive correlation between monetary compensation and management power,and there is a positive correlation between o-the-job consumption and management power;the size of board of supervisors and audit committee both negatively moderate the relationship between monetary compensation and management power,and the relationship beteween on-the-job consumption and management power.(3)There is a positive correlation between management power and monetary pay stickiness of state-owned enterprise executives;there is a positive correlation between management power and on-the-job consumption stickiness of executives,but the stickiness decreases.

关 键 词：企业绩效 管理层权力 高管薪酬 国企薪酬改革 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]