论戴维森隐喻观中的维特根斯坦语言哲学渊源  

Metaphorical Meaning:Davidson and Wittgenstein

作　　者：徐强 Xu Qiang(School of Philosophy,Southwest Minzu University,Chengdu 400065,China)

机构地区：[1]西南民族大学哲学学院,400065

出　　处：《北京第二外国语学院学报》2020年第2期104-117,共14页Journal of Beijing International Studies University

基　　金：国家社科基金后期资助项目“论魏斯曼对‘中期’维特根斯坦哲学的阐释与发展”(项目编号:19FZXY004)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文以戴维森的《论隐喻的含意》以及维特根斯坦代表性哲学文本为研究对象,以文本分析为研究方法,考察戴维森隐喻观中的维特根斯坦语言哲学渊源,发现戴维森隐喻观中的维特根斯坦思想渊源体现在四个方面:(1)戴维森对隐喻意义和隐喻使用的“划界”思想跟维特根斯坦对“可说”和“不可说”的“划界”观存在关联;(2)戴维森把隐喻意义的理解纳入隐喻使用范畴,这跟后期维特根斯坦语义思想一致;(3)戴维森对隐喻“认知意义”的批判跟维特根斯坦有关“感觉内部对应物”的批判都是“反心理主义”;(4)戴维森和维特根斯坦都认为理解隐喻的意义是一种哲学“洞见”。对隐喻意义的把握始终要基于隐喻的具体使用语境。This paper investigates Ludwig Wittgenstein’s influence on Donald Davidson’s thoughts in“What Metaphors Mean”.By analysing Davidson’s and Wittgenstein’s key philosophical writings,we argue that such influence can be generalised into four points:(1)there is a connection between Davidson’s division of metaphor’s meaning from its application and Wittgenstein’s demarcation of the“sayable”and“unsayable”in his Tractatus;(2)Davidson’s idea of categorising the understanding of the meaning of metaphor into the realm of metaphor’s actual application is in accordance with Wittgenstein’s later views on semantics;(3)the essential argument behind Davidson’s refutation of the conception of metaphor’s“cognitive meaning”and Wittgenstein’s critique of“the inner-object conception of sensations”is“antimentalism”;and(4)both Davidson and Wittgenstein thought that the interpretation of the meaning of language(metaphor)can be regarded as an“insight”in philosophy.All in all,“metaphorical meaning”and“cognitive meaning”are empty concepts,and the interpretation of metaphor’s meaning should always be placed in the specific context where metaphor occurs.

关 键 词：隐喻 隐喻意义 隐喻使用 戴维森 维特根斯坦 认知意义 语言哲学 

分 类 号：B561[哲学宗教—外国哲学]