考虑制造商开设展厅的横向竞争博弈及定价-服务策略  

Horizontal Competition Game and Price-Service Strategies Considering Manufacturers Opening Showrooms

作　　者：张琴义 刘咏梅[2] 李学兰[1] ZHANG Qin-yi;LIU Yong-mei;LI Xue-lan(School of Management,Anhui Science and Technology University,Bengbu 233100,China;School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽科技学院管理学院,安徽蚌埠233100 [2]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2020年第5期171-180,共10页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：安徽科技学院人才引进项目(GLYJ201801);安徽省高校优秀青年人才支持计划项目(gxyq2019058)。

摘　　要：从体验成本差异角度出发,将消费者分为高低体验成本两类,利用Hotelling模型构建消费者的效用函数。分析两个竞争性制造商关于开设展厅的Bertrand博弈以及展厅开设后的价格与服务决策。结果表明,当低体验成本消费者较多且产品匹配度较高或者低体验成本消费者较少时,两个制造商均开设展厅,但双方都获得最低的利润,陷入囚徒的困境;当低体验成本消费者较多且产品匹配度较低时,两个制造商都不开设展厅,双方达到帕累托最优。This paper divides consumers into two types,high and low experience cost consumers based on different experience cost,and then establishes the utility function for each consumer.Subsequently,it analyzes the Bertrand game between two manufacturers about whether to open the showrooms and their corresponding price-service strategies after opening the showroom.Finally,it analyzes the equilibrium of opening showroom.The results show that both manufactures would open showrooms when the percentage of low experience cost consumers and the likelihood of a product match are high or the percentage of low experience cost consumers is low,but both manufacturers would get the least profits and trap into Prisoner’s Dilemma.Under the condition of high percentage of low experience cost and low likelihood of product match,both manufacturers will choose not to open showroom and both parties achieve Pareto Optimality.

关 键 词：展厅模式 退货 体验成本 价格与服务策略 BERTRAND博弈 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]