哈贝马斯论真理与证成  

Habermas on Truth and Justification

作　　者：南星[1,2] Nan Xing

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系 [2]北京大学外国哲学研究所

出　　处：《世界哲学》2020年第5期89-100,F0003,共13页World Philosophy

摘　　要：哈贝马斯早期提出了一种“共识论”或“话语理论”的真理观,将西方哲学长期以来以“看”为中心的认识模式转变成了以“说”为中心的模式。然而这一理论完全缺乏实在论的维度,因此面临许多哲学上的困难。这些困难导致哈贝马斯后来提出了一种新的“实用主义”真理观。借助于这种新的真理论,哈贝马斯力图将真理的“看”“说”“行”三个维度整合在一起。这一整合后的理论尽管仍然存在一些问题,但却极具启发意义。In the 1970s,Habermas proposed a“consensus theory”or“discourse theory”of truth,by virtue of which he intended to transform the“seeing”-model of cognition that dominates the tradition of western philosophy since Plato into a“speaking”-model of cognition.However,due to the complete lack of any realistic dimension,this theory is confronted with a lot of difficulties,which led him to propose a new,“pragmatic”conception of truth in the 1990s.With this new conception,Habermas attempted to integrate three dimensions of truth(“seeing”,“speaking”and“acting”)into a unified theory.Although the new theory is not without its own problems,it sheds great light on our understanding of the nature of truth.

关 键 词：哈贝马斯 真理 证成 共识论 实用主义 

分 类 号：B516[哲学宗教—外国哲学]