“重奖轻罚”能推动企业创新吗?——基于内部控制与内部治理调节作用的视角  

Can“Heavy Reward and Mild Punishment”Promote Corporate Innovation?Based on the Perspective of Internal Control and Internal Governance

作　　者：易颜新[1] 裘凯莉 YI Yanxin;QIU Kaili(School of Accounting,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310000,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,浙江杭州310000

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2020年第5期40-50,共11页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(16BGL068)。

摘　　要：以2007-2017年A股上市公司为样本,检验高管薪酬粘性对企业创新投资的影响以及内部控制与内部治理对该影响的调节作用。研究发现:高管业绩薪酬中的粘性特征可以推动企业的创新投资;高质量的内部控制与内部治理均能强化高管薪酬粘性对高管创新决策行为的激励功能。进一步研究发现:内部控制在内容上包含内部治理,内部控制能通过内部治理中介来实现其部分调节作用;高管薪酬粘性不完全是一项有意的契约设计,若企业的高管薪酬粘性是因内部人控制和信息不对称问题所引起的,它将丧失对高管行为的激励功能,无法有效地推动企业的创新投资活动。Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017,this paper tests the influence of executive pay stickiness on enterprise innovation investment and the moderating effect of internal control and internal governance on this influence.The results indicate that the stickness of executive performance pay can promote corporate innovation investment and high-quality internal control and internal governance both play a strengthening role in the incentive function of executive compensation stickiness to executive innovation decision-making behavior.Further research finds that internal control includes internal governance in content,and internal control can achieve part of its regulatory role through internal governance intermediary.If the stickiness of executive compensation is caused by insider control problem and information asymmetry,it will lose its incentive function on executives behavior and can not effectively promote the innovation investment activities of enterprises.

关 键 词：高管薪酬粘性 企业创新 内部控制 内部治理 高管行为 内部人控制 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F272.5[经济管理—企业管理]