考虑双边风险偏好的供应链期权协调模型  

The supply chain option contract coordination model with bilateral risk preferences

作　　者：蔡鑫[1,2,3] 孙静春[1,2,3] CAI Xin;SUN Jingchun(School of management,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an,710049,China;Key Laboratory of Process Control&Efficiency Engineering(Xi’an Jiaotong University),Ministry of Education,Xi’an,710049,China;State Key Laboratory for Manufacturing Systems Engineering(Xi’an Jiaotong University),Xi’an,710049,China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]西安交通大学过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,陕西西安710049 [3]西安交通大学机械制造系统工程国家重点实验室,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2020年第6期128-137,共10页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372164)。

摘　　要：本研究针对供应商和销售商双边都具有风险偏好的两级供应链系统,建立了由悲观系数和风险厌恶度两个风险偏好系数描述的基于M-CVaR(均值条件风险价值)决策准则的供应链期权契约模型。首先根据销售商的决策目标函数推导了不同风险偏好(风险厌恶、风险中性和风险喜好)下的销售商最优总订购量,分析了不同风险偏好系数下销售商最优总订购量的变化情况。然后,在考虑供应商同样具有风险偏好的情况下,讨论了销售商和供应商的风险偏好对供应链整体风险偏好的影响,推出了供应链整体在不同风险偏好下的最优订购量。最后,给出了销售商和供应链整体不同风险偏好组合下供应链的协调条件,并通过算例分析了风险偏好系数对销售商订购策略及供应链整体风险偏好的影响。研究表明:(1)M-CVaR准则下,期权契约能够协调双边都具有风险偏好的供应链,而且还能提高供应链的最优订购量;(2)考虑双边风险偏好时,供应链整体的风险偏好类型由供应商和销售商的风险偏好共同决定,供应链协调条件同时受到供应商和销售商的风险偏好系数的影响。The globalization of economy and the rapid development of science and technology have made the current business environment full of uncertainty. In order to enhance competitiveness in this environment, companies must enhance their ability to flexibly respond to the changes of market environment. This is particularly true for enterprises dealing with perishable goods with comparatively long production lead-times and short selling seasons and subject to high demand uncertainty. In order to hedge against the risk associated with over-and under-ordering, retailers usually have to order less but more frequently from their upstream firms such as manufacturers so that they can well accommodate demand volatility. Such an order policy, however, exerts great pressure on the manufacturers because it requires them to have flexible capacity to cater for the irregular orders, which results in an increase in the manufacturers’ costs. As a result, it will lead to conflict between channel partners and reduce channel efficiency. To solve this problem, an effective approach is to design incentive contracts that enable retailers to respond flexibly to changes in demand and avoid undue pressure on manufacturers. In all forms of contract, the option contract has attracted the attention of scholars thanks to its good flexibility and risk-sharing, and has been proved to be effective in resolving the channel conflicts described above(Barnes-Schuster et al., 2002;Zhao et al., 2010). However, when considering the risk preferences of decision makers, the decision criteria of the supply chain members changed, and the contract that originally coordinated the risk-neutral supply chain tended to lose efficacy. Therefore, under the option contract, it is of certain academic and practical significance to discuss the influence of different risk preferences(risk aversion, risk neutral and risk appetite) of decision makers on the optimal strategies of supply chain members and supply chain coordination. This paper studies the coordination problem o

关 键 词：供应链协调 双边风险偏好 均值-CVAR 期权契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]