车辆技术水平对汽车共享企业博弈决策的影响  

The Influence of Vehicle Technology Level on the Game Decision of Car Sharing Enterprises

作　　者：王海霞 左小德[2] 胡盛强 WANG Haixia;ZUO Xiaode;HU Shengqiang(School of Business Administration,Guangdong University of Finance,Guangzhou 510521,China;School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China;School of Business Administration,Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou 510320,China)

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院工商管理学院,广东广州510521 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632 [3]广东财经大学工商管理学院,广东广州510320

出　　处：《经济与管理》2021年第2期71-83,共13页Economy and Management

基　　金：广州市哲学社会科学规划项目(2020GZGJ122);教育部人文社会科学研究一般资助项目(17YJC630042);广东省教育厅人文社科特色创新资助项目(2017WTSCX043)。

摘　　要：对汽车共享企业在双寡头竞争情境下的决策进行研究,考虑纳什博弈、斯坦伯格博弈和合作博弈三种竞争决策。结果表明:当两家汽车共享企业车辆技术系数不等时,对技术系数高的企业而言,合作博弈下的利润永远高于其他博弈下的利润;对技术系数低的企业而言,当本企业共享汽车数量及技术系数均高于一定阈值,或竞争企业的共享汽车数量及技术系数均低于一定阈值时,合作决策最优,否则市场跟随者策略最优。当两企业技术系数相等时,合作是两企业共同的最优选择,否则两企业将处于不停的决策制定中。The decision-making of car-sharing firms in a duopoly competition situation is studied by considering three types of competitive decisions:the Nash game,the Steinberg game,and the cooperative game.The results show that when two car-sharing firms have unequal vehicle technology coefficients,the profits under the cooperative game are always higher than those under the other games for the firm with high technology coefficients;for the firm with low technology coefficients,the cooperative decision is optimal when both the number of shared cars and technology coefficients of this firm is above a certain threshold,or both the number of shared cars and technology coefficients of competing firms are below a certain threshold,otherwise the market-follower The chaser strategy is optimal.When the technology coefficients of the two enterprises are equal,cooperation is the optimal choice for both enterprises,otherwise,the two enterprises will be in non-stop decision making.

关 键 词：汽车共享 车辆技术系数 纳什博弈 斯坦伯格博弈 合作博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] C93[经济管理—国民经济]