人工道德主体是否可能的意识之维  

The Dimension of Consciousness about the Possibility of Artificial Moral Agent

作　　者：刘永安[1] LIU Yong-An(Taizhou college of Nanjing Normal University, Taizhou 225300, China)

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学泰州学院,江苏泰州225300

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第2期117-122,共6页Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“西方元伦理学中的道德客观性问题研究”(17AZX012)。

摘　　要：随着人工智能技术的发展,人工智能体日益表现出一定的自主、自治的主体性行为特征,这催生了人工道德主体是否可能的论题。意识问题是制约人工道德主体是否可能的关键维度。目前人工智能体能在功能等价的意义上对意识的智力性认知层面予以模拟,但并不具备对于一个道德主体来说至关重要的现象学意识。人工智能体缺乏产生现象学意识的本体论基础;缺乏现象学意识第一人称的定性特征;缺乏现象学意识的情感元素和移情理性。因此,目前的人工智能体尚不是伦理自治的主体,不能成为完全意义上的道德主体。With the development of artificial intelligence technology,artificial intelligence entities are increasingly showing the autonomous characteristics of subjective behavior,which has led to the issue of the possibility of artificial moral agent.At present,the issue of consciousness is a key dimension that restricts the possibility of artificial moral agent.Now,the entities of artificial intelligence can simulate the intellectual cognition of consciousness in the sense of functional equivalence,but they do not have phenomenological consciousness,which is crucial for a moral agent.The artificial intelligence entities lack the ontological basis of producing phenomenological consciousness,the first-person qualitative characteristics of phenomenological consciousness and the emotional elements or empathic rationality of phenomenological consciousness.Therefore,the current artificial intelligence entity is not the agent of ethical autonomy and cannot become a moral agent in the full sense.

关 键 词：人工智能体 道德主体 现象学意识 心智信息观 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]