外部经理人市场、信息租与成本控制效率  

External Managerial Labor Market,Information Rent and Efficiency of Cost Control

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作  者:崔健波[1] 罗正英[2] CUI Jianbo;LUO Zhengying(School of Economics and Management,Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,Zhenjiang 212003,China;Dongwu Business School,Soochow University,Suzhou 215006,China)

机构地区:[1]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江212003 [2]苏州大学东吴商学院,江苏苏州215006

出  处:《南京审计大学学报》2021年第2期59-68,共10页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基  金:江苏省社会科学基金一般项目(19GLB004)。

摘  要:利用委托人(国企总部)和代理人(生产单元管理者)对于后者成本控制能力信息的不对称,优秀管理者在当期就有动机付出低努力、冒充普通管理者,以规避下期更为苛刻的成本控制业绩要求,引致棘轮效应。为抑制该效应,从而实现成本控制高效率,委托人需识别管理者类型,却又面临高额信息租。考虑两期有(无)跨期承诺激励方案,纳入外部经理人市场影响因素,将国企总部与生产单元之间的博弈均衡模型化为一个完美贝叶斯均衡。构建动态逆向选择模型,设计最优激励方案,探讨实现分离均衡时,激励管理者付出高努力的条件和信息租。研究发现,民企对国企人才的竞争,弱化了棘轮效应,信息租降低。By using the asymmetric information about the ability of the principal(headquarters of state-owned enterprises)and the agent(managers of manufacturing units)on the latter s cost control,the excellent managers have the motivation to make low efforts in the current period and pretend to be ordinary managers,so as to avoid the more stringent performance requirements of cost control in the next period,which leads to the ratchet effect.In order to restrain this effect and achieve high efficiency of cost control,the principal needs to identy the type of managers,but faces high information rent.Considering two-period incentive scheme with(without)intertemporal promise and the interfering factors of external managerial labor market,the game between headquarters and manufacturing units is modeled to be perfect Bayesian equilibrium.This study constructs a dynamic adverse selection model and designs optimal incentive schemes to discuss condition and information rent that will motivate managers exerting high effort under separating equilibrium.Research result shows that the competition between private enterprises and state-owned enterprises for talents weakens the ratchet effect and reduces the information rent.

关 键 词:成本控制 棘轮效应 外部经理人市场 信息租 承诺激励 国企总部 生产单元管理者 贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号:F275.3[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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