亨利生命现象学非“新柏格森主义”析论——对法国学者让·拉克鲁瓦一个说法的质疑  

An analysis of Michelle Henry's phenomenology of life as non-“Neo-Bergsonism”:A challenge to French scholar Jean Lacroix

作　　者：江海全 JIANG Haiquan(School of Marxism,Nantong University,Nantong 226019,China)

机构地区：[1]南通大学马克思主义学院,江苏南通226019

出　　处：《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第2期38-46,共9页Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“亨利与柏格森的生命现象学思想比较研究”(17XZX005)。

摘　　要：法国学者让·拉克鲁瓦将米歇尔·亨利描述为“一个新柏格森”,也就是说,他认为亨利生命现象学是一种新柏格森主义。从表象上看,亨利的确很像柏格森:其一,柏格森被认为是生命哲学的集大成者,亨利宣称自己所创立的哲学为生命现象学,对生命问题的共同关注奠定了二者交流和对话的思想基础。其二,从二者的思想起点来看,两位生命哲学大师不自觉地走在了一起,亨利在《显现的本质》中几乎完全复制了柏格森在《时间与自由意志》中对费希纳心理物理学的批判。但亨利生命现象学是一种情感现象学,亨利认为情感实际上是生命中的自行感发,而柏格森的创造性的生命更像一种生物学的生命概念。从学术路径看,二者的出发点和旨趣也有较大差异。基于亨利和柏格森哲学思想之间的这些不同,亨利生命现象学不能被看作是一种新柏格森主义。French scholar Jean Lacroix describes Michelle Henry as“the new Bergson”,that is to say,he considers Henry's phenomenology of life as a kind of neo-Bergsonianism.Superficially,Henry indeed resembles Bergson.Firstly,Bergson is considered to be the representative of philosophy of life,and Henry claims that his own philosophy is a phenomenology of life.The common concern about life lays the foundation for communication and dialogue between them.Secondly,even from the starting points of their thoughts,the two masters of life philosophy walk together unconsciously.Henry in The Essence of Manifestation almost completely copies Bergson's critique at Fechner's psychophysics in Time and Free Will.Nevertheless,Henry's phenomenology of life is an affective phenomenology,and Henry argues that affection is actually the auto-affection in life,while Bergson's creative life is more like a biological concept of life.From the perspective of academic path,there are huge differences in their starting points and purports.Based on these differences between Henry's and Bergson's philosophical thoughts,Henry's phenomenology of life cannot be regarded as a kind of neo-Bergsonism.

关 键 词：生命现象学 生命冲动 自行感发 柏格森 米歇尔·亨利 

分 类 号：B516.5[哲学宗教—外国哲学]