基于公平偏好和过度自信的风险投资契约模型  

A Venture Capital Contract Model Based on Fairness Preference and Overconfidence

作　　者：潘晓 李云飞[1] PAN Xiao;LI Yun-fei(School of Mathematics&Information,China West Normal University,Nanchong 637001,China)

机构地区：[1]西华师范大学数学与信息学院,四川南充637001

出　　处：《中小企业管理与科技》2021年第10期159-161,共3页Management & Technology of SME

基　　金：西华师范大学英才科研基金项目(17YC381)。

摘　　要：论文将行为经济学中的非理性心理引入传统的风险契约模型,考虑风险企业家具有公平偏好和过度自信心理情况下的激励机制。研究表明,风险企业家对风险企业产出的最优分享比例会随着公平偏好程度和过度自信程度的增加而增加。风险企业家的创造能力高,最优努力水平随着公平偏好程度的增加而增加;风险企业家的创造能力低,最优努力水平随着公平偏好程度的增加而减小。This paper introduces the irrational psychology of behavioral economics into the traditional venture contract model,and considers the incentive mechanism in the context of venture entrepreneurs with fairness preferences and overconfident psychology.The study shows that the optimal sharing ratio set by the venture entrepreneurs for the output of the venture enterprises increases with the increase of the degree of fairness preference and overconfidence.Venture entrepreneurs'creativity is high,and the optimal effort level increases with the increase of fairness preference degree.Venture entrepreneurs'creativity is low,and the optimal effort level decreases with the increase of fairness preference degree.

关 键 词：风险投资 公平偏好 过度自信 激励机制 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]