高管团队内部治理与企业资本结构调整——基于非CEO高管独立性的视角  

Internal Governance and Capital Structure Adjustment:Evidence from the Perspective of Non-CEO Executives'Independence

作　　者：张博[1] 韩亚东 李广众[2] ZHANG Bo;HAN Yadong;LI Guangzhong(School of Business,Renmin University of China;School of Business/Advanced Institute of Finance,Sun Yat-sen University)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872 [2]中山大学管理学院/高级金融研究院,广东广州510000

出　　处：《金融研究》2021年第2期153-170,共18页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71772190、U1811462、71991474)的资助。

摘　　要：本文以2001-2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了高管团队内部治理对企业资本结构的影响。研究发现:当企业负债不足时,高管团队内部治理效应能够显著提高企业(尤其是非国有企业)的负债水平,降低企业实际资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。这种高管团队内部治理效应在第一类委托代理问题比较严重以及非CEO高管监督动机较强的企业中更加显著。作用机制分析表明,高管团队内部治理效应能够通过降低第一类代理成本来降低企业资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。本文的研究结论为改善我国上市公司治理提供了新的思路,对于优化企业融资结构、深化金融供给侧结构性改革具有一定的启示意义。Decisions regarding capital structure directly affect long-term corporate performance and value.Morellec,Nikolov,and Schurhoff(2012)emphasize the role of agency conflicts in corporate financing decisions and develop a tradeoff model to investigate the importance of manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice.Following Morellec et al.(2012),other studies investigate the roles of various corporate governance mechanisms,such as external governance mechanisms,board oversight,and executive compensation contracts,in alleviating the problem of sub-optimal capital structures caused by the conflicts between shareholders and managers.However,most studies focus on individual CEOs as the representatives of the top management team,the roles of non-CEO executives in corporate decision-making have not been fully examined.Non-CEO executives have a significant influence on corporate decision-making as they are the implementers of business decisions,and thus monitor and constrain the self-interested behavior of CEOs.The internal monitoring that takes place from the bottom up within a top management team(TMT)is known as TMT internal governance.The effectiveness of internal governance within a TMT requires non-CEO executives to be independent from the CEO.In China,a CEO has the right to propose the appointment or dismissal of non-CEO executives.The CEO may prefer to select non-CEO executives who share similar values,and these executives may also be grateful to the CEO who hired them,thus diminishing their monitoring role.In this study,we use the proportion of the top four highest-paid non-CEO executives appointed before a current CEO’s arrival to measure TMT internal governance.The larger this proportion,the greater the independence of non-CEO executives and the stronger the TMT internal governance.Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2017,we investigate the effect of TMT internal governance on capital structure decisions.We find that TMT internal governance significantly increases a firm's leverag

关 键 词：高管团队 高管团队内部治理 资本结构 代理成本 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F272.91