意愿与选择:亚里士多德道德责任理论的两个条件  

Willingness and Choice:Two Conditions of Aristotle′s Moral Responsibility Theory

作　　者：黄家诚 田广兰[1] HUANG Jiacheng;TIAN Guanglan(School of Politics and Public Administration, Soochow University, Suzhou Jiangsu 215000,China)

机构地区：[1]苏州大学哲学系,江苏苏州215000

出　　处：《江苏科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第1期27-34,共8页Journal of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“技术时代的道德责任问题研究”(17BZX107)。

摘　　要：亚里士多德的道德责任理论在更精确的意义上而言是一种道德评价理论,关乎行为主体的活动与品质。意愿是引出行为的一种潜能,包含对行为环境的了解;选择是意愿能力的成熟与发展,包含对达成目的所需手段的考虑。意愿考察的对象侧重于行为,选择考察的对象侧重于行为者的品质。意愿是亚氏道德责任理论的充分条件,选择是必要条件。从概念史角度来看,道德责任概念起初被限定为一种道德评价理论,到了近代才兴起以结果追责为要义的第二种解释。厘清这一点,对于把握道德责任理论在不同社会历史时期的作用具有重要意义。In a more precise sense,Aristotle′s moral responsibility theory could be addressed as one kind of moral evaluation theory,concerningthe practice and characterof the subject.Willingness is a potential ability which has already included the basic understanding of the environment and may turn intobehaviors;Choice is the maturation and development of willingness,including the consideration of the means needed to achieve the end.The theory of willingness is usually used to analyze the method applied to its goal,while the theory of choice pays more attention to the quality of themoral agent.Willingness is the sufficient condition of Aristotle′s moral responsibility theory,and choice is the necessary condition.From the perspective of the history of the idea,the concept of moral responsibility was initially limited as a moral evaluation theory,and the second interpretation accountable for results only emerged in modern times.It is of great significance to clarify this point for grasping the role of moral responsibility theory in different social and historical periods.

关 键 词：道德责任 意愿 选择 《尼各马可伦理学》 

分 类 号：B82-0[哲学宗教—伦理学]