快乐的量与质:西季威克对边沁和密尔的批判  

The Quantity and Quality of Pleasure:Sidgwick's Criticism of Bentham and Mill

作　　者：谢声远 Xie Shengyuan

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院

出　　处：《理论界》2021年第4期35-41,共7页Theory Horizon

摘　　要：边沁和密尔分别提出快乐能够在“量”上与在“质”上相比较的观点。西季威克通过澄清“快乐”概念的定义来支持边沁在快乐的量上的区分,否定密尔提出的“快乐的质”的合理性,并指出密尔的举措是对直觉主义的误用。西季威克认为,合理使用的直觉主义方法能够为功利主义提供正确的基础。因此,西季威克对快乐不可公度性的批判,一开始就是基于他对直觉主义的理解。Bentham and Mill respectively proposed that pleasure could be compared in quality and quantity.By clarifying the definition of the concept of pleasure,Sidgwick supported Bentham's distinction in the quantity of pleasure,denied the rationality of the quality of pleasure proposed by Mill,and pointed out that Mill's thought was the misuse of intuitionism.Sidgwick believed that the rational use of intuitionism methods could provide the right foundation for utilitarianism.Therefore,Sidgwick's criticism of the incommensurability of pleasure was based on his comprehension of intuitionism.

关 键 词：西季威克 快乐 可公度性 直觉主义 功利主义 

分 类 号：B1[哲学宗教—世界哲学]